From TPM Reader JM …
With regards to Geithner, I have been thinking a lot about this whole AIG mess and one of the things I keep coming back to is that Geithner is basically a one man band right now because neither the Dep Secy nor key Asst Secy positions at Treasury have been filled. That is not highly unusual at this point in an Admin and most Secys just struggle along until they can fill the positions. The problem Geithner has is he is dealing with multiple crises while not having a core team in place. At my day job I run large projects for my company and when you get stretched for time and resources you end up prioritizing what seems most important. 90+% of the time you get it right but when you don’t it is usually bad.
The Obama Admin will never say this publicly but I would not be surprised if what happened here is that Geithner saw the AIG bonuses as a secondary issue and prioritized the bank stress tests, TARP money, the auto bailout, etc. Having no key team members in place he didn’t delegate it to the staff in his office or to the careers who are filling in temporarily while the subcabinet positions are confirmed. And now you have a mess.
I know a lot of people are calling for Geithner’s head but I think you have to give him a chance to get staffed up and see what he can do. If he is still struggling 9 mos from now, get rid of him.
In the meantime, I think Obama needs to lean on Paul Volker more. He is the only person in his Admin who has dealt with anything close to this kind of crisis and he has a ton of credibility.
I had heard this AIG bonus bill described as being more or less narrowly tailored to claw back AIG’s bonuses. That in fact was why some people were saying it might amount to some sort of unconstitutional action since it focused on a narrow class of individuals. But that’s not what this is about at all. Unless I’m misunderstanding this, it applies to the entirety of the concentrated financial sector — all TARP recipients talking over $5 billion.
If you have a household income over $250,000, and you receive a bonus, 90% of that bonus would be taken back in taxes — through a mix of income and excise taxes.
This strikes me as pretty ill-advised on a couple levels.
First, what’s to stop the companies from just folding the ‘bonuses’ into straight salary income? In which case, the whole thing goes out the window?
Second, this cuts a pretty broad swathe. You don’t want CEOs who drove their companies into the ground pulling down multi-million dollar bonuses from companies that wouldn’t even exist any more without big taxpayer handouts. And the folks at AIGFP who played a big part in driving the whole economy into the ditch with their reckless and possibly criminal behavior shouldn’t big reaping big rewards of taxpayer money.
But it’s not clear to me why a couple, both of whom work in the financial services industry, and make $150,000 each should essentially have their entire bonuses taken back in taxes.
This seems like just another example of perverse outcomes from the ‘worst of both worlds’ approach we’re taking to the whole finance industry bailout — keep the same people in charge of the institutions, keep effectively insolvent institutions afloat, but throw a lot of federal dollars in their direction and put in place fairly draconian tax provisions for money that’s spent in ways we find either wasteful or offensive.
Late Update: A number of readers have written in to say they’re not shedding any tears for a couple making a combined income of $250,000 who face a huge tax hit on the income they make over that amount. But I’m not either. It’s not a fairness issue in my mind. I think it’s too broad a brush, probably too destabilizing to a financial sector we’re already trying to stabilize. Of course, I was figuring we should have ushered a lot of these companies through some sort of managed restructuring or bankruptcy, in which case a lot of this would simply be moot. But as long as we’re doing it this way, as I said, this just seems like the worst of both worlds.
Late Accountancy Update: One reader points out that there are big tax benefits to the companies to paying compensation in the form of bonuses as opposed to ordinary salary income, which is no doubt the reason why, for many in the finance industry, the bonuses totally dwarf the base salaries.
Even Later Accountancy Update: Tax attorney TPM Reader JN adds the following: “This is only correct with respect to the CEO and the other 4 most highly paid officers of a company (there is a limitation on deductibility of compensation over $1,000,000 paid to these people except for certain incentive-based compensation – the TARP bill has additional limitations that aren’t relevant here). For ordinary employees of a company there is no tax difference to the company between paying straight salary and a bonus (although I imagine there could very well be accounting benefits of which I am not aware).”
From the Daily Beast …
An employee who worked in Madoff’s legitimate brokerage operations, described by the fraudster in his plea agreement as being “successful and profitable,” has told The Daily Beast that they were in fact money losers that acted as a front for his Ponzi scheme.
He said that the legitimate businesses, the proprietary and market making arms on the eighteenth and nineteenth floors of Madoff Securities were designed to lure investors in, especially highly-placed figures in society and to fool the SEC into thinking that he had a large and impressive galaxy of businesses.
The bill to tax back those AIG bonuses passed overwhelmingly in the House, but the GOP leadership split. As it turns out, Rep. Eric Cantor (R-VA), the minority whip, ended up voting for the bill, despite all his hedging this morning on MSNBC.
There’s no end of puffed up outrage and opportunistic posturing over the on-going revelation of the AIG bonus scandal. But some line has been crossed. And it’s worth thinking really clearly about just what that line is.
What is so damaging about this isn’t the money — which is almost trivially small compared to the many hundreds of billions we’ve already committed. The problem is what appears to be the president’s mortifying impotence in the face of bankers and financiers who created the problem. The president speaks and acts for the federal government, which is to say, the American people, who have mobilized more than a trillion dollars and all powers of the state to repair the damage emerging out of the financial sector. And with all that, he’s jacked up on a employment agreement between a company the government now owns and derivatives traders who sank the world economy and may quite likely be looking at criminal charges for their activities in the not too distant future?
Anyone can look at that and see that the equation of power and accountability is all screwed up.
I think the American people have demonstrated over the last six months that they’re willing to expand vast sums of money and endure great economic hardship without holding the damage against their political leaders. Effectiveness, in the sense of how long it takes to turn the economy around, is something they seem willing to be flexible on. But not on who’s in charge. And that’s what’s at stake here. As a matter of transparency and truth-telling, what Geithner knew about the bonuses may be significant. But it’s really all fine print that is largely beside the point. From Geithner and Summers, and indirectly from Obama, we keeping hearing financial-legal versions of ‘It’s bigger than the both of us’. Like we’re along for the ride, still taking dictates from the people who got us into the mess we’re in.
There are various specific points you can drill down on. Atrios grabs this deliciously obnoxious passage from a piece in the Post today …
“Nobody is going to give it back and then stay,” said one of the firm’s employees. “If they give back the money, then they will walk. And they will walk into the arms of AIG’s counterparties.”
So, give us our money or we’ll go to the counter-parties and help them really suck you dry. Even though this ignores the fact that the counter-parties have no actual right to the money. They placed bets with a company that did not have the money to pay off the bets. There’s a old-fashioned business solution to that kind of problem — due diligence.
We’re paying them off, either in full or in part, out of fear that pulling the plug on these contracts would so destabilize the global economy that paying it is a better solution than not. But we’re doing it for us. Not them. They are, at best, collateral beneficiaries. So all the talk of whatever self-serving or legally dubious contracts they penned for themselves two or three years ago are beside the point.
Or at least that’s the idea. Unless we’re actually just chumps and Obama — via Geithner and Summers — have simply ceded the running of the whole thing to the people who caused all the problems in the first place. And we are just along for the ride even though we’re paying the bill.
In this sense, this isn’t a distraction. Yes, the dollar amounts are small. And pols across the spectrum are demagoguing the thing for all its worth. But the real issue of who’s in control, and whose interests are being served, cuts through every dollar we’ve dedicated to this project. And when you look closely at the much bigger AIG counter-party issue, the same disconnect is there every bit as much as it is with the bonuses.
Whether Geithner and Summers are too close to the people on Wall Street, either through interest or affinity, is an interesting and possibly important question. But fundamentally Obama needs to start showing that he’s in charge, that he’s operating as the American people’s advocate and that he has the power to do it — which these stories of getting jacked up by some Gordon Gecko wannabes in London just terribly undermines. But to do that, to show that, it has to be true. And that might require some real changes in policy and possibly in personnel too.
We’ve gotten a lot of really thoughtful (and agitated) reader responses to my earlier post on whether David Axelrod and Rahm Emanuel are tone deaf politically on the AIG bonuses mess (my question was narrower: what’s the political up-side for the White House of downplaying the bonuses — but readers took that question and ran with it). We’ve posted the best ones.
We’ve got new crises to worry about, it seems. But today is the sixth anniversary of the Iraq War. And we’re commemorating the day with a photographic timeline of the war, from day one until today. Take a look. The images will bring you back.
Looming on the horizon is a complete rewrite of the financial regulatory system, the kind of fundamental change that comes along only once every few generations. How that shapes up will depend in part on how quickly the economy emerges from the acute phase of this crisis — and to a large extent will be shaped by the “lessons” we supposedly learn from this train wreck. Oftentimes, we learn the wrong lessons, at least initially, and (no surprise here) the conventional wisdom about what those lessons are is heavily influenced by those with a stake in the outcome. So I talked this week with Jerry Caprio, professor of economics at Williams College and co-author most recently of Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern, about how the debate over regulatory reform should be framed: