There’s no question that Trump’s Iran War has been a disaster for the United States. There’s no way around that. The U.S. can absorb the cash costs of the conflict without too much difficulty. But along with everything else Trump has done over the last 18 months, it has given the U.S. the reputation of what amounts to a rogue state. Rebuilding trust in U.S. actions and intentions at best will be a very long process. The conflict has also redounded massively to the benefit of China, the only real peer competitor to the U.S. on the global stage.
But I wanted to point out two impacts of the war which are some versions of positives even if they are secondary effects of a disastrous adventure that never should have happened.
The first one is that there’s now little question that the U.S.-Iran War of 2026 has decisively accelerated the transition to renewables like wind and solar, as well as nuclear energy. This article in the New York Times discusses this aspect of the equation. The prerequisites for this outcome are the ever-falling costs of renewables and continuing breakthroughs in battery technology, which are necessary to handle the discontinuity issues with renewables. But this is maybe the second energy shock of this decade. With costs competitive, the instability and insecurity of hydrocarbon supply lines is just too great. It’s too risky. This is a highly technical set of questions. And you can’t really know what five and 10 and 20 years out looks like in the heat of the conflict. But I closely follow a lot of experts on the renewables transition. And the collective weight of their opinion leaves me in little doubt that this is real. Especially for developing economies and countries in East Asia which import almost all their hydrocarbons, the instability is just too great.
This is in its own way a major win for China since China has made major, major investments in renewables — both domestically and as an export technology — just as the U.S. is doing everything in its power to hobble its own renewables industry. That’s not great on many levels. But the fate of the planet is a reality that transcends the jockeying for advantage between the great powers of the age.
The second bright spot is within a far smaller aperture but it’s worth recognizing. Israel is going to elections on October 27. Benjamin Netanyahu has really never fully recovered from the hit to his popularity and credibility stemming from the Hamas attacks on kibbutzes near Gaza almost three years ago. But he’s made some progress, and, whether or not he deserves the credit, Israel landed huge blows against Hezbollah under his leadership in the years since. But Trump’s deal with Iran is developing into an electoral nightmare for Netanyahu for two key reasons.
The first is simply that it’s a really good deal for Iran. What’s more, it obligates Israel to end its attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon even though Israel wasn’t a party to the negotiations. So for the moment, Netanyahu’s tight alliance with Trump and role in launching the Iran War, perhaps helping coax Trump into thinking it would be an easy win, is looking very bad.
But there’s another level of the apparent denouement of the conflict, closely related but distinct, which is important to understand. It’s a basic part of Israeli political culture, as well as defense doctrine, that Israel must maintain freedom of action to pursue what it sees as its strategic interests and ensure the security of the state. In a way this is central to Zionism itself, which at a foundational level is about non-reliance on non-Jewish friends or states to protect the Jewish or Israeli national community. In key ways this was always more concept than reality. Look at Ben Gurion’s letters and discussions during the 15 years he served as prime minister, and he is obsessed with the need for Israel to find a Great Power benefactor to ensure its own survival and flourishing.
But even if it is a incomplete self-conception, it’s a deep one. And Netanyahu has been pretty clearly revealed — as his electoral opponents are now making very clear — that he has essentially turned over Israeli defense policy to Donald Trump. That’s very damaging for him. It may turn out to be the final nail in his political coffin.
How that plays out long term is less clear to me because the Israelis really love Donald Trump — which yes, is the source of endless sadness and embarrassment for me but life isn’t fair. So I’m less clear whether this will really change that over time. But given that the nature of this agreement with Iran, maybe it will.