The president was in Alabama the other day for a couple of events, including a fundraising reception for Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), who’s up for re-election next year. Bush delivered a fairly predictable speech on Sessions’ behalf, but one comment stood out.

The president was explaining how his current war policy came together:

“I listened very carefully to senators like Jeff Sessions and senators who didn’t agree with what Jeff and I believed was necessary. I listened to our military. That’s what you want your President doing. […]

“So I made the decision to name a new commander, as well as send troops into Baghdad, all aiming to give this young democracy a chance to survive the relentless attacks from extremists and radicals who want to prevent their emergence.” (emphasis added)

This comes up from time to time, but the president is simply wrong. He makes this claim quite a bit, but Bush didn’t shape his policy on the advice of “our military.” Remember this from January?

When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take action they initially resisted and advised against. […]

It may also be a sign of increasing assertiveness from a commander in chief described by former aides as relatively passive about questioning the advice of his military advisers. In going for more troops, Bush is picking an option that seems to have little favor beyond the White House and a handful of hawks on Capitol Hill and in think tanks who have been promoting the idea almost since the time of the invasion.

In November, after the election, CentCom commander Gen. John Abizaid rejected the notion of a so-called surge, saying that he “met with every divisional commander, Gen. Casey, the core commander, Gen. Dempsey” and asked them if bringing “in more American troops now, [would] add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq and they all said, ‘No.'”

Indeed, Bush fired Gen. Casey, in large part because he neglected to tell the president what he wanted to hear.

And yet, here we are, just a few months later, watching Bush brag about how his policy followed the advice of the generals — which is “what you want your President doing.” Please.

If Bush wants to reject the advice of top military leaders, that’s his prerogative; he is regrettably the Commander in Chief. But he really needs to drop this I-listened-to-our-military schtick.

Despite mounting outcry, Rudy still refuses to sever ties to priest accused of sexually abusing children. That and other political news of the day in today’s Election Central Saturday Roundup.

Following up on Election Central’s piece, it looks like Rudy Giuliani has a real problem here. Time’s David Von Drehle asked a highly relevant question in his latest piece: “How many alleged criminals can a law-and-order candidate be associated with before it starts to hurt?” Von Drehle posed the question after Thomas Ravenel, the chairman of Giuliani’s presidential campaign in South Carolina, was indicted on cocaine distribution charges, which, of course, comes on the heels of revelations about Giuliani’s connections with Bernard Kerik.

But if Von Drehle’s deadline was just one day later, he would have been able to include an even more damaging example of Giuliani’s questionable associations.

Giuliani employs his childhood friend Monsignor Alan Placa as a consultant at Giuliani Partners despite a 2003 Suffolk County, N.Y., grand jury report that accuses Placa of sexually abusing children, as well as helping cover up the sexual abuse of children by other priests. Placa, who was part of a three-person team that handled allegations of abuse by clergy for the Diocese of Rockville Centre, is referred to as Priest F in the grand jury report. The report summarizes the testimony of multiple alleged victims of Priest F, and then notes, “Ironically, Priest F would later become instrumental in the development of Diocesan policy in response to allegations of sexual abuse of children by priests.” […]

Placa has worked for Giuliani Partners since 2002. As of June 2007, he remains on the payroll. “He is currently employed here,” Giuliani spokeswoman Sunny Mindel confirmed to Salon, adding that Giuliani “believes Alan has been unjustly accused.” Mindel declined to discuss what role Placa plays with the consulting firm, or how much he is paid. Says Richard Tollner, who testified before the grand jury that Placa had molested him, “[Giuliani] has to speak up for himself and explain himself. If he doesn’t, people shouldn’t vote for him.” Adds Anne Barrett Doyle, co-director of BishopAccountability.org, which tracks suspected priest abuse, “I think Rudy Giuliani has to account for his friendship with a credibly accused child molester.”

The Salon piece, by Alex Koppelman and Joe Strupp, touches on some very serious allegations. This is more than just Giuliani sticking up for a long-time friend after he came under fire. As Marc Ambinder explained, in 2003, “a grand jury concluded that Placa was at the center of a diocese-wide effort to cover up nearly 60 allegations of sexual abuse by its priests.” The same report found that Placa was “cautious but relentless” in “pursuing his victims,” but was never charged because the statute of limitations had run out.

Von Drehle’s Time article noted, “[A]ll candidates live in fear that a prominent supporter will become an embarrassment in the middle of a campaign.”

In Giuliani’s case, there are three (Kerik, Ravenel, and Placa). And counting.

In Washington, I think this is what one might call a “winning argument.”

Washington, D.C. House Democratic Caucus Chairman Rahm Emanuel issued the following statement regarding his amendment to cut funding for the Office of the Vice President from the bill that funds the executive branch. The legislation — the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill — will be considered on the floor of the House of Representatives next week.

“The Vice President has a choice to make. If he believes his legal case, his office has no business being funded as part of the executive branch. However, if he demands executive branch funding he cannot ignore executive branch rules. At the very least, the Vice President should be consistent. This amendment will ensure that the Vice President’s funding is consistent with his legal arguments. I have worked closely with my colleagues on this amendment and will continue to pursue this measure in the coming days.”

Very clever. Good for Rahm.

If the Office of the Vice President is a branch unto itself, I’m sure Emanuel will consider Cheney’s own appropriations bill, independent of any actual executive-branch spending.

Matt Yglesias had an amusing item this morning, mocking Jonah Goldberg for arguing that the media steered clear of embarrassing FDR photos “because the press almost unanimously agreed that — despite the huge news value — depicting FDR as a cripple would be bad for the war effort.” Since Roosevelt had polio when he took office in 1933, and World War II didn’t start until 1941, Yglesias is able to deduce — using arithmetic — that perhaps Goldberg is confused.

But as long as we’re having fun at Goldberg’s expense, let’s also take a moment to review his recent LA Times op-ed, in which he recommended eliminating the national public school system and replacing it with a private system, subsidized through vouchers.

Consider Washington, home of the nation’s most devoted government-lovers and, ironically, the city with arguably the worst public schools in the country. […]

Private, parochial and charter schools get better results. Parents know this.

Condemning the nation’s public schools by cherry-picking one troubled school district seems like the basis for a poor argument. For that matter, it’s hardly an apples-to-apples comparison — private schools in DC can discriminate against applicants based on everything from test scores to behavioral problems, while public schools in DC have to take everyone.

But even if we put all of that aside and consider Goldberg’s argument at face value, he still runs into empirical trouble: “Students in the D.C. school voucher program, the first federal initiative to spend taxpayer dollars on private school tuition, generally performed no better on reading and math tests after one year in the program than their peers in public schools, the U.S. Education Department said.”

And what about Goldberg’s contention that charter schools also perform better? Well, Bush’s Education Department found that charter schools nationwide under-perform, with test scores showing “charter school students often doing worse than comparable students in regular public schools.” (The Bush administration responded to the report by announcing it would sharply cut back on the information it collects about charter schools.)

Try again, Jonah.

In an odd column a few months ago, Richard Cohen praised John McCain for having “a visceral hostility toward the ways of Washington’s K Street lobbying crowd.”

It looks like the Arizona Republican has come around on the lobbyists he claims to disdain.

John McCain, who made his name attacking special interests, has more lobbyists working on his staff or as advisers than any of his competitors, Republican or Democrat.

A Huffington Post examination of the campaigns of the top three presidential candidates in each party shows that lobbyists are playing key roles in both Democratic and Republican bids — although they are far more prevalent on the GOP side. But, all the campaigns pale in comparison to McCain’s, whose rhetoric stands in sharp contrast to his conduct.

“Too often the special interest lobbyists with the fattest wallets and best access carry the day when issues of public policy are being decided,” McCain asserts on his web site, declaring that he “has fought the ‘revolving door’ by which lawmakers and other influential officials leave their posts and become lobbyists for the special interests they have aided.”

In actual practice, at least two of McCain’s top advisers fit precisely the class of former elected officials he criticizes so sharply.

For the candidate who based his 2000 campaign on challenging lobbyists and “entrenched” special interests, McCain has put together quite a crew: two of Washington’s most powerful, high-paid lobbyists — Tom Loeffler and Slade Gorton — are co-chairmen of the senator’s presidential campaign. “All told,” Tom Edsall reported, “there are 11 current or former lobbyists working for or advising McCain, at least double the number in any other campaign.”

To be sure, McCain’s “clean” image was always more rhetoric than reality. Regardless, McCain still bills himself as a “reformer” who’s wiling to challenge the DC establishment, and a surprising number of political journalists still buy into the hype.

It’s what makes reports like these so damaging.

Since the outset of the war in Iraq, Bush and his administration have enjoyed almost unfettered control over policy. Everything the president has asked for, the president has received.

Of course, more than four years after Bush launched the war, we now know that every decision the administration has made falls into one of three categories: a) wrong; b) tragically wrong; or c) you’ve-got-to-be-kidding-me wrong.

Therefore, when searching for someone to blame for the failures, it’s only natural to target the one group of Americans who’ve had no influence on administration policy whatsoever.

IN THE MAIL: Col. Buzz Patterson’s War Crimes: The Left’s Campaign to Destroy Our Military and Lose the War on Terror.

I don’t think that the left wants to lose the war on terror, exactly — they just want Bush to lose the war on terror. I suspect, however, that Patterson’s theme is one that we’ll hear more in the future, especially if things go badly in Iraq.

As Kevin Drum responded, “You can almost smell the stink of desperation from the pro-war crowd. The next couple of years is going to be a nonstop frenzy of books, articles, TV shows, op-eds, radio segments, blog posts, and white papers about how everyone except George Bush and his enablers were responsible for our catastrophe in the Middle East.”

What worries me is that some of these clowns actually believe their talking points. The RNC and Republican lawmakers churn out a lot of nonsense in the hopes of directing attention away from the White House’s foreign policy fiascos, pointing the finger at those who had no power to speak of from 2003 to 2006. The rhetoric is more pitiable than infuriating; one gets the sense that GOP flacks know how pathetic it is.

But Reynolds, Patterson, and some on the right actually seem to buy into the claptrap. There’s a disconcerting sincerity to it. Indeed, Patterson was recently asked, “Surely you’re not calling Democrats traitors. Or are you?” To which he responded, “I am.” He did not appear to be kidding.

Honestly, it’s like watching a Twilight Zone episode.

The fact that Dick Cheney considers his office distinct from the executive branch seems to have captured the political world’s attention this week, and given the bizarre nature of the story, that’s undoubtedly an encouraging development. Consider the lede from a piece in yesterday’s LA Times:

For the last four years, Vice President Dick Cheney has made the controversial claim that his office is not fully part of the Bush administration in order to exempt it from a presidential order regulating federal agencies’ handling of classified national security information, officials said Thursday.

Cheney has held that his office is not fully part of the executive branch of government despite the continued objections of the National Archives, which says his office’s failure to demonstrate that it has proper security safeguards in place could jeopardize the government’s top secrets.

One of the angles that’s gone largely unnoticed about all of this is that it’s actually old news. Cheney started holding himself out as some kind of unaccountable, pseudo-fourth branch of government way back in February. The blogs noticed, and explained how crazy the argument is, but the media yawned. No one pushed the White House to explain, the Republican-led Congress barely lifted an eyebrow, and everyone just moved on, satisfied that Dick Cheney had established his own superbranch.

It’s interesting — and if anyone can explain the reasoning, I’m all ears — but the same important story that was ignored in February is suddenly fascinating in June. The same questions that bloggers asked then are unexpectedly interesting to everyone else now.

As Digby noted, “Nobody gave a damn until Henry Waxman decided to issue a report that wondered why Dick Cheney was trying to shut down the agency that had crossed him. Then everyone ‘discovered’ that Dick Cheney has created a fourth branch of government that answers to no one — something we were talking about months ago.”

Don’t get me wrong, I’m delighted to see everyone asking, “Does Cheney really think this”? But I am curious: what took the non-blogging political world so long?

In 2001, shortly after his inauguration, Dick Cheney met with Dan Quayle, who had of course served in the same position eight years earlier. Quayle wanted to offer some advice, one vice president to another.

“Dick, you know, you’re going to be doing a lot of this international traveling, you’re going to be doing all this political fundraising … you’ll be going to the funerals,” Quayle said. “We’ve all done it.”

Recalling the conversation, Quayle said Cheney “got that little smile,” before replying, “I have a different understanding with the president.”

The first of a four-part series in the Washington Post today on Cheney’s White House role, written by Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, helps demonstrate just how true those comments were. Today’s profile helps document the scope and breadth of a Vice President with unprecedented (and largely unchecked) authority. Cheney wanted a “mandate that gave him access to ‘every table and every meeting,’ making his voice heard in ‘whatever area the vice president feels he wants to be active in,'” and, naturally, Bush gave his VP what he requested.

It’s hard to know which of the many jaw-dropping anecdotes to highlight, but Cheney’s work in establishing military commissions for detainees stood out for capturing all the characteristics of Cheney’s hyper-secretive, ruthless, legally-dubious style.

At the White House, Bellinger sent Rice a blunt — and, he thought, private — legal warning. The Cheney-Rumsfeld position would place the president indisputably in breach of international law and would undermine cooperation from allied governments. Faxes had been pouring in at the State Department since the order for military commissions was signed, with even British authorities warning that they could not hand over suspects if the U.S. government withdrew from accepted legal norms.

One lawyer in his office said that Bellinger was chagrined to learn, indirectly, that Cheney had read the confidential memo and “was concerned” about his advice. Thus Bellinger discovered an unannounced standing order: Documents prepared for the national security adviser, another White House official said, were “routed outside the formal process” to Cheney, too. The reverse did not apply.

Powell asked for a meeting with Bush. The same day, Jan. 25, 2002, Cheney’s office struck a preemptive blow. It appeared to come from Gonzales, a longtime Bush confidant whom the president nicknamed “Fredo.” Hours after Powell made his request, Gonzales signed his name to a memo that anticipated and undermined the State Department’s talking points. The true author has long been a subject of speculation, for reasons including its unorthodox format and a subtly mocking tone that is not a Gonzales hallmark.

A White House lawyer with direct knowledge said Cheney’s lawyer, Addington, wrote the memo. Flanigan passed it to Gonzales, and Gonzales sent it as “my judgment” to Bush. If Bush consulted Cheney after that, the vice president became a sounding board for advice he originated himself.

Cheney and his small team had, by design, excluded the Justice Department, the NSA, and the State Department to create the entire policy, which would also circumvent the federal judiciary.

Occasionally, through a combination of hype and fear, certain public figures are exaggerated into scary, powerful caricatures.

And sometimes, the caricatures understate the case.

The Cheney profile has enough tidbits for a week’s worth of blog posts, but in the meantime, this is obviously a must-read piece. If you’re reading it with Sunday-morning breakfast, keep a bottle of Maalox handy.

That Dick Cheney is secretive is hardly news, but seeing just how secretive is striking.

Stealth is among Cheney’s most effective tools. Man-size Mosler safes, used elsewhere in government for classified secrets, store the workaday business of the office of the vice president. Even talking points for reporters are sometimes stamped “Treated As: Top Secret/SCI.” Experts in and out of government said Cheney’s office appears to have invented that designation, which alludes to “sensitive compartmented information,” the most closely guarded category of government secrets. By adding the words “treated as,” they said, Cheney seeks to protect unclassified work as though its disclosure would cause “exceptionally grave damage to national security.”

Across the board, the vice president’s office goes to unusual lengths to avoid transparency. Cheney declines to disclose the names or even the size of his staff, generally releases no public calendar and ordered the Secret Service to destroy his visitor logs. His general counsel has asserted that “the vice presidency is a unique office that is neither a part of the executive branch nor a part of the legislative branch,” and is therefore exempt from rules governing either. Cheney is refusing to observe an executive order on the handling of national security secrets, and he proposed to abolish a federal office that insisted on auditing his compliance.

Stick it in a time capsule; future generations won’t believe it.