I’ve told you before about my kind of love/hate feelings about Tom Edsall, longtime reporter for The Washington Post, who more recently writes a weekly column for the New York Times. It’s not too much to say that almost regardless of the facts of the moment he’ll come up with an explanation for why those facts are terrible news for Democrats. Yesterday’s column is a kind of tour de force in this genre (“This Is a Realignment That Has Significant Staying Power.”) The column collects quotes and quick exchanges with a range of political scientists who argue that the first six months of 2025 have shown just how enduring Donald Trump’s 2024 realignment is turning out to be and quickly dismisses the views of the few observers he quotes who disagree.
As someone who tries to comment on and understand current events as best as I’m able, columns like this are kind of a warning sign of a path not to go down, that path being looking for the analyses and data points which back your preferred view of things or the one you feel reflexively must be the case. So I tried my best to not do that while thinking about this piece.
There are two key data points observers refer to when arguing that Democrats are actually in trouble or struggling, notwithstanding mounting opposition to Donald Trump. The first is the low public standing of the Democratic Party itself, which is very real. As I’ve argued before, when you look closely at those numbers, their main driver is Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents who don’t think incumbent Democrats have the will for or interest in fighting. So this number has always looked different to me than it does to some others. How people see incumbent Democrats isn’t the most important thing to me. It’s how many voters want some version of the government built on the things Democrats say they support. Most of the current unpopularity is based on people who don’t think the current officials can do their job effectively. As I’ve argued before, “the Democrats” are the party’s voters. Incumbents can be replaced and — contrary to what I’ve thought at other points in my career — I think a lot of them should be.
The second data point is more complicated. The congressional generic ballot is our best barometer of the upcoming midterm election. We’re way too far out to have it tell us too much. But at present the numbers are significantly closer than they were back in 2017. Depending on which average you use, Democrats are now favored by between two and three points. Back in 2017, that was around six points. That’s a significant difference. And it’s the best evidence I see that mounting unpopularity for President Trump isn’t clearly translating into electoral advantage for Democrats.
The counter to that is that 2017 was a year when politics were in profound disequilibrium. Donald Trump had by no means solidified control over the Republican Party, let alone a majority of the country. Large portions of the GOP coalition saw him at best as a kind of useful idiot or necessary tool who could be controlled or dispatched when needed. That created way more downside potential for Trump in 2017 and 2018. I think that’s the main factor. Trump has now consolidated the Republican Party. So his hold over that coalition is much stronger. Of course this is really just a different way of characterizing Trump’s strength and Democrats’ relative weakness in a zero-sum electoral calculus. But it’s also clear elected Democrats’ reputation for fecklessness must also be limiting Democrats’ upside. My overall take here remains that our electoral system is a zero-sum contest at the federal level. One side’s weakness is the other side’s strength. Mounting opposition and anger at Donald Trump will translate into gains for Democrats, even if that opposition isn’t totally crazy about being translated like that.
But these aren’t absolutes. Certainly, at the margins, this purely zero-sum calculus breaks down.
So here are my current thoughts on how Democrats — voters and elected officials — can or should try to deepen opposition to Trump and translate that into legislative seat gains.
The first is obvious. To the extent Democrats are weakened by their reputation for not effectively fighting Trump, they should be taking every opportunity to do that now. Yes, this is kind of obvious. But give me a moment and I’ll connect it to a point I think makes the meaning more clear. They should take every opportunity to fight and draw attention to unpopular things. They shouldn’t be worried about the downsides of opposing a president who now routinely has 55% of the population in opposition him.
Second, the campaign message is obvious and is the one every successful midterm opposition makes. Put a check on Trump’s illegal, out-of-control, violent, stupid policies. There’s no check on him. Put a check on him. This is the ultimate “don’t overcomplicate it.” People are really, really opposed to the stuff Trump is doing now. Say you’ll rein him in. The catch, though, is that to make that credible you really need to show that you’re maxing out the limited power congressional Democrats currently have. So fighting harder and more effectively today doesn’t just address damage to the Democratic brand — it’s essential to underpin the best campaign strategy and message.
Third, people should be mounting primary campaigns against pretty much every Democrat who is in a safe seat. The greatest attention is on a few right-leaning Dems who’ve managed to win in Trump districts. That’s stupid. Democrats need those seats. But in safe seats, run primaries. I’m not saying everyone needs to go, but everyone needs to be put to some test. To deal with the Trump crisis you need caucuses made up only of wartime consiglieres. So make way for one or become one. I remain convinced this is not mainly about ideology, it’s about who’s willing to fight and who isn’t. That’s my prescription.