Read Bernard Avishai’s post on the situation in Hebron and all of Israel-Palestine.
I think he’s right. Israel is no longer able to solve this problem alone, if it ever could. It’s festered too long. And the settlers are too big a danger — too clear and immediate a threat — to Israel’s survival to keep ignoring the problem.
How badly did government mishandle the prosecution of Sen. Ted Stevens? So badly that an FBI agent on the case has blown the whistle on prosecutors. We’ve got the heavily redacted complaint posted here.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai thinks sending 30,000 new troops is not a good idea.
I’ve been extremely skeptical of the idea of government aide to the commercial real estate industry. So I’m passing on this note from TPM Reader KS, who makes the contrary case. The key point to me about KS’s argument is how much turns on the fact that the bailed out banks aren’t using the TARP funds for lending, which remains perhaps the greatest scandal of the whole bailout saga …
As a commercial real estate attorney, I’m deeply involved with the current complete freeze-up of the commercial lending markets. I have many clients who have sound business practices in the development of commercial real estate.
Suddenly, and coinciding with the Lehman/Goldman fiasco, the commercial lending markets completely disappeared. Not just a slow down, but a complete and total shut down. Loans for which there were commitments were suddenly pulled. Term loans (most in the development world are for 1-2 years at a time) were suddenly not available for renewal putting borrowers in immediate default, or the lender required severe principal reductions in order to for the borrower to renew – severe to the point of not possible.
I’m not talking about over-speculative developers here asking for a bail-out. I’m talking about fiscally responsible developers, on-time payors with pared down staffs, who wrongly believed that the TARP funds going to the major banks would be put into circulation in the credit markets for new loans and renewals, which are the life-blood of the real estate industry. One bank had the temerity to tell me on a conference call that they were using the TARP funds for acquiring other banks, not for new loans or renewals.
And here lies the problem with the Paulson/Bernacke/Frank plan…they once again trusted the banks “to do the right thing”, (a la Greenspan), without requiring that the TARP funds go right back into the lending stream through the conduit of the banks. I’m not socialist, but I sure would agree for a Bank of US to come out of this mess. This is happening today, and the warnings are clear, and the results will be catastrophic.
I don’t know how many of you have seen HBO’s House of Saddam. I really didn’t know what to expect from a mini-series about Saddam Hussein. There are so many obvious pitfalls, it’s hard to know where to start. But it’s actually really, really good. And the portrayal of Saddam is actually surprisingly sympathetic, at least sympathetic in the broader context of mass-murdering dictators. (And no, that’s not just ironic snark — I’ll try to elaborate in a subsequent post about what I liked about it.)
But if you watch the credits one funny or ironic or just (for me) hard to forget things about drama is that Saddam is played by an Israeli (Igal Naor), something that must sit fabulously well with Arab nationalists.
Dan Ephron explains the larger phenomenon of Israelis so often playing Arabs on the big screen.
Darrel Dochow, a inspector from the Office of Thrift Supervision, who didn’t shut Charles Keating down in time, was still around to lend a fishy helping hand to IndyMac, before it swirled down the drain earlier this year.
Dochow has now been “removed” pending an internal investigation.
TPM Reader JM pipes up on the Yglesias story …
As an in utero blogger, I’m watching L’Affaire Yglesias with acute interest. Institutionally supported blogging is an increasingly common model, yet there seem to be no rules on how far bloggers can go in crossing their home institution (if at all).
I’m trying to imagine what would happen if a New York Times blogger accused the Pulitzer committee of promoting “hyper-timid bullshit.” What if a magazine-affiliated blogger like Drum or Sullivan said that about a sister publication?
Of course my inclination is to push for as much blogger freedom as possible. But as institutional affiliations become more common, blogging may lose some of the free-wheeling style that made it popular to begin with. It’s a tricky balance to strike, and I’m not sure I know the answer. But I’m thinking very hard about it…
I actually don’t think some trans-institutional system is possible or even desirable. Different kinds of publications, different kinds of institutions will chart their own choice, with their institutional credibility falling or rising accordingly.
Can you believe it’s been 20 years since Pan Am 103 was brought down on Lockerbie, Scotland?
Everybody, it seems, wants a bailout. And observers are left demanding bailouts for some industries (cars) and bewailing them for others (commercial construction, hedge funds). But as I watch this unfold I feel increasingly concerned that the people controlling the money are using the complexity of the situation and the public’s difficulty in understanding it to use public money to shield very wealthy institutions and individuals from the inherent risks of their chosen line of work.
There’s a basic distinction that should be guiding all the public expenditure we’re doing in the finance sector. There’s no reason to use public money to compensate people who’ve lost a lot of money on bad investments, no interest in bailing out big commercial or investment banks that made lousy investments. (I’m particularly suspicious of the commercial building folks who say they want the Treasury IV as well.) What I think we all recognize though, at least in principle, is that there’s a strong public interest in preventing major disruptions in the financial sector that could hobble the rest of the economy.
But I keep hearing more and more examples that sound a lot more like trying to socialize the losses of the major investment houses and hedge funds and their owners than trying to achieve any reasonable public purpose. Because it’s very difficult for most people to distinguish in practice between structural intervention (as I’ve defined it above) and unjustified bailouts for people who made bad investments.
It’s a slow news week. And this is going to require a lot of digging. But this is something that we’re going to be digging into in a big way. So for all of our readers who have insight into this question, please let us know where we should be looking.