In Washington over the last two months, the debate was over whether the Stimulus Bill was too large. But the math — that is to say, expected fall in aggregate demand compared with offsetting stimulus spending — suggested a completely different problem. Namely, that it was too small, probably offsetting a half or less than half of the demand sucked out of the economy by the collapse of the housing bubble. And as the Post reports on tomorrow’s front page, the verdict seems to be in: yep, it was too small.
There are many different metrics to use to get to this judgment. But a key one is that the Obama budget, which came out at the end of last month, assumed an average unemployment rate of 8.1% during 2009. Presumably, that was the assumption behind the Stimulus math too. But since we now know that the unemployment rate spiked to 8.1% in February that prediction seems unrealistically optimistic — perhaps by a long shot.
All of which is to say that the monthly economic data are rapidly catching up with the pessimists’ assumption about kind of steep and lasting recession we have in store.
Nor is it only the size of the Stimulus Bill that is implicated in these changing numbers. Because if the administration has been assuming less bleak unemployment rates than we’re likely to see, then the tax revenues that the budget is based on won’t come in and ‘stress tests’ they’re running the banks through probably aren’t stressful enough.
Joining the chorus, Martin Feldstein says we’re likely to need a second Stimulus Bill. Perhaps soon.
Just out from the Journal (sub.req.) …
The beneficiaries of the government’s bailout of American International Group Inc. include at least two dozen U.S. and foreign financial institutions that have been paid roughly $50 billion since the Federal Reserve first extended aid to the insurance giant.
Among those institutions are Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Germany’s Deutsche Bank AG, each of which received roughly $6 billion in payments between mid-September and December 2008, according to a confidential document and people familiar with the matter.
The gist of the rest of the piece is that, as many have surmised, European banks had a disproportionate exposure to AIG’s potential collapse.
And just to be clear, the named institutions and even the few specific dollar amounts are broadly in line with what people expected. The only difference being that this report appears to be based on actual documentation of where the money went rather than informed speculation.
For now — until the results from a St. Paul court room come in — Democrats hold 58 seats in the Senate, meaning Democrats are so close, yet so far, from pushing through an unfettered liberal agenda.
On another point, there’s also this sentence: “What’s making Democrats even more anxious is the recent suggestion by Minnesota Republican Norm Coleman that he may push for a revote, which would leave that Senate seat open for several months longer.”
I’m hearing a fair amount of this in the Drudge/Fox/Politico echo chamber. But are people really anxious about this? As this race has consistently shown, anything can happen. I don’t want to say anything’s impossible. But … what’s pretty clear in Minnesota, if not in Washington, is that Coleman doesn’t have a revote option. There’s nothing to push for. I could push for the Minnesota courts to seat me as a compromise candidate. But it’s just not one of the menu options Minnesota law makes available.
According to Mike Allen, the people around Michael Steele are thinking he should bring on a co-chairman who will focus on organizing, management and fundraising and let Michael stay focused on TV appearances where he’s doing such a bang-up job …
Let’s just stipulate DC Republicans are simply not part of the discussion when it comes to repairing the US economy or arresting our slide into deep economic misery. And any reporters who aren’t clear about this are just lying to their readers or viewers. The latest Republican plan, in the face of today’s new spike in unemployment, is a freeze on federal spending. I’m not even sure it’s fair to say that this is a replay of the disastrous decisions the magnified the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933. It’s more a parody of it. When the crisis is a rapid and catastrophic drop off in demand, you handcuff the one force that can create demand (i.e., the federal government) in the throes of the contraction. That’s insane. Levels of stimulus are a decent question. Intensifying the contraction is just insane and frankly a joke. It’s time to recognize that the only debate here is happening among Democrats and sundry non-affiliated sane people. The leaders of the GOP are simply not part of the conversation.
When you invite insurance and derivatives experts to explain their area of specialty and critique each other’s understanding of the subject matter, be ready for an afternoon with a lot of squinting and head scratching.
(ed.note: For more on this whole AIG issue, do see this Wednesday post by Barry Ritholtz. I cannot see why the policy solution he proposes at the end wasn’t the obvious non-taxpayer-ripoff solution.)
Illinois state prosecutors investigating Sen. Roland Burris (D) for perjury want to listen to the tapes the feds have of conversations between Burris and the brother of ousted Gov. Rod Blagojevich.
TPM Reader SG’s take on the derivatives, bankruptcy and AIG issue …
I beg to differ with GG on two points. First, the subsidiaries of AIG are insurance companies that are by law required to have enough reserves to manage situations like this, thanks to the remnants of Glass Steagall of course. Now, I am not an expert on insurance biz but this claim by GG seems doubtful to me. Second, I have traded derivatives myself and know this much that the market professionals (not the amateurs who think they have info) already have enough info on what AIG owes to whom and they are benefiting immensely by this weired Geithner process. They are getting out calmly and coolly while the rest will be left holding the bag. So, GG’s contention that if Geithner releases the names it will have this domino effect doesn’t pass the smell test on any count. People who trade derivatives tend to be people who are in the KNOW and by definition know what is owed to whom. Geithner releasing this info won’t have any effect because this is already known to the “market” just not to the ordinary citizen who by definition again DOES NOT KNOW and DOES NOT TRADE these instruments. If you don’t believe me then ask Prof. Krugman. My claim is that this is just all a hoax to let the wall street buddies get out while the going is good and then let these institutions fail. Outcome will be the same whether the info is released now or later…”controlled-depression.”
Back to the earlier question of what the argument would be for allowing derivatives to hop to the front of the line in bankruptcy proceedings. A number of very generous readers have written in and try to explain the arguments to me, whether they agree with those arguments or not. I think I understand it. But nearly well enough that I’m going to embarrass myself by trying to explain it to you. Having said that, my takeaway from the discussing is that a lot of this has to do with further gaming the difference between derivatives and insurance. Namely, the folks working with derivatives want them to be insurance when the issue is the ‘rights’ insurance has in bankruptcy proceedings but not be insurance when it comes to falling under the regulatory regimes that very tightly control actual insurance.