Just out from the Post …
The number of Americans who believe that the nation is headed in the right direction has roughly tripled since Barack Obama’s election, and the public overwhelmingly blames the excesses of the financial industry, rather than the new president, for turmoil in the economy, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.
A lot of clues now coming into focus suggest that aside from selling credit default swaps one of AIG Financial Products main line’s of work was what the uninitiated among us refer to as tax evasion.
Jack Murtha: If loving my constituents is wrong … I don’t wanna be right!
Quick question: following up on the post from last night about Kindle, would you be interested in subscribing to TPM on Kindle for a small fee? We’ve had a lot of people ask why we haven’t made TPM and our news blogs subscribable on Kindle. So I’m curious how many of you there might be out there.
To date we’ve focused more on allowing you to read TPM on mobile devices. Kindle’s a different revenue set up, since you can’t run ads but only charge a subscription fee. So it’s not something we’ve focused on before.
So do you have a Kindle and might you subscribe? Shoot us a quick note. To be clear, you’re not committing to anything. This is just some quick and dirty audience research.
TPM Reader J on the automakers …
As a 30+ year veteran of the auto industry let me make the difference very clear; the banks can exist without the auto industry. The same cannot be said for the reverse. The automobile business from the manufacturers down to the consumers rely on banks for one reason or another.
While the current economic situation has brought the oversight deficiencies in the banking industry to the forefront, the automakers have spent the better part of the last 40 years ignoring their core businesses and focusing on short term profits and muddled business plans. Anyone with a clear view of the industry knew this day was coming, it was just a matter of when. The fact that banks aren’t making loans in order to buy cars just accelerated this downfall.
I was meeting a friend in the GM building in downtown Detroit about 18 months ago and was astounded to learn how few people there were actually involved in making cars and how many were involved with other GM business interests.
In Chrysler’s case, this was a weak company driven into the ground and thoroughly looted by it’s “merger” with Daimler-Benz. It was funny going to hotels around the Chrysler headquarters in Auburn Hills and thinking you were in Germany due to the huge number of German speaking guests. Each staying for long periods of time on the company dime and all being charged to Chrysler.
Ford has been the most proactive of the three and should be alright with minimal interruption, although any changes in the basic labor agreement with the other manufacturers will impact Ford union employees as well.
The topic of the day is whether there’s some imbalance or unfairness between the government’s treatment of the automakers and the finance sector. And one frequent response from readers has been that at the end of the day the bankers have a viable business model and the automakers do not. And that dictates different treatment.
Now, I can’t imagine any way to ask for more trouble than to get into comparisons between the troubles of the automakers and the banks, with all the differences between them. As we know, US automakers have been in relative decline for three or four decades (judged in terms of market share vs. imports) and absolute decline for a while. But I’m curious about how much we know about the business model and viability of the banks. Surely, banks as such aren’t going anywhere. But these institutions?
One reader writes: “One easy answer to this question is that the banks have a viable
business model. They simply need to stop taking so much risk, and they’ll be immensely profitable given the current interests rates they’re borrowing at.”
But high levels of risk are at the root of the big banks’ high profits (at least until recently) and also of the current mess. So it’s not immediately clear to me how you just fiddle with the risk variable and that doesn’t leave the whole system fundamentally changed, with very different profit levels. It’s not precisely the same. But you could also say that all the automakers have to do is start selling more cars. Not so easily done. You can’t risk your cake and eat it too.
Just to anticipate a lot of email responses. I’m certainly not saying that the current crisis means that banking is no longer a viable business. But these kinds of banks — at this rough size, at these levels of leverage and risk, and at these levels of sustained profitability — is that still a viable model? Is a healthy one for the country?
Which brings me to a different but somewhat related point.
When do we downsize these banks? A key part of the crisis, perhaps the key part of the crisis is that these banks were so big that we could not let them endure the normal fate of failed businesses, which is to fail. So when do we break them up into more smaller entities? Yes, we’ve got our hands full now. But companies always fight being broken up. So it’ll be much harder if and when these companies struggle back to some level of health. So when does that happen?
NRSC chair John Cornyn: Norm Coleman’s gonzo effort to win re-election in Minnesota could go on for years!
Late Update: Will there be backlash against state GOP?
It seems like everyone has a blog these days, even AIGers complaining about not getting their bonuses. But in posts from London-based AIGer Paul Harriman and his wife Jan Ellen, Ellen says that since January 2008, Paul “has been working with Congressional auditors and investigators and the FBI to compile evidence on the deals and dealings of the people responsible, most particularly Joe Cassano.”
The more I look at these investment decisions of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and former Lehman exec Charles Millard the more my suspicion grows that some very bad happened here. There’s no question that something happened very bad for the pensioners who were relying on this fund. But is there any conceivable good reason why you’d take most (the quote from the Boston Globe is “much” of the funds) of the assets of the fund designed to insure pension benefits out of safe investments like bonds and put them into highly speculative investments — hedge fund, equities, etc. — just before the stock market collapsed.
Incompetence doesn’t cut it as an explanation.
First, some topline numbers: The PBGC decided to put most of its $64 billion of reserves into stocks. And already by September 2008, i.e., before the bottom really fell out on Wall Street, the stock portfolio had already lost 23%. That percentage must be much higher today.
One of the big drives behind Social Security privatization was the desire to find more money — in the case of Social Security, a lot more money — to keep the fires burning on Wall Street. Not just more fees for the people handling the money, but more money to keep pushing asset values higher. This looks like the same thing just using slightly different means.
Late Update: TPM Reader HL notes that the behavior here is not at all unlike that of investment managers at a lot of big institutions who should pursue at least relatively conservative investment strategies — college endowments, state pension funds, big non-profits, etc. And this is a very good point — all part of the ever-escalating need over recent years, for greater and greater rates of return. Some worrisome hints came out this weekend about CALPERS (the California state pension system), for instance. So point taken. What still makes me suspicious about this case, though, is the timing. The Globe piece leaves some key variables a little vague — just how much was put into stocks, precisely when, etc. But it sounds at least like PBGC moved a big portion of its assets into stocks last spring or summer.
