If you watch the Sunday shows tomorrow, watch to see which if any of the hosts asks an administration guest this question: If Tenet and the CIA are guilty of not pushing hard enough to keep bogus or ‘highly dubious’ information out of the State of the Union speech, who was pushing on the other side? 
Read Tenet’s ‘mea culpa‘ (self-criticism session?) closely and you’ll see it points right back at Condi Rice’s NSC.
As noted in yesterday’s post, we have a pretty clear idea what the interplay was between the CIA and the White House. The CIA expressed reservations about the Niger-uranium claims. The White House pressed to keep it in. Officials at the NSC, by several accounts, suggested getting around the CIA’s reservations by using public statements by the British government as a figleaf — even though the CIA believed the British assessment was incorrect.
Whose hands are dirtier? The folks who caved in to pressure and signed off on that figleaf? Or the folks who pressed for it?
This is a passage buried at the end of the New York Times Saturday article …
Before the speech, the crucial conversations between the C.I.A and White House over whether to include the African reference in the State of the Union address were held between Robert G. Joseph, a nuclear proliferation expert at the National Security Council, and Alan Foley, a proliferation expert at the C.I.A., according to government officials.
There is still a dispute over what exactly was said in their conversations. Mr. Foley was said to recall that before the speech, Mr. Joseph called him to ask about putting into the speech a reference to reports that Iraq was trying to buy hundreds of tons of yellowcake from Niger. Mr. Foley replied that the C.I.A. was not sure that the information was right.
Mr. Joseph then came back to Mr. Foley and pointed out that the British had already included the information in a report. Mr. Foley said yes, but noted that the C.I.A. had told the British that they were not sure that the information was correct. Mr. Joseph then asked whether it was accurate that the British reported the information. Mr. Foley said yes.
Other government officials said, however, that Mr. Joseph did not recall Mr. Foley’s raising any concerns about the reliability of the information. If he had, they said, Mr. Joseph would have made sure that the reference was not included in the speech.
There are at least three separate reports that the idea for the British figleaf came from the White House side. Those reports are buttressed by common sense. If the CIA was questioning using the Niger claims and the White House was pressing for it, what sense does it make that the idea of having it come from the Brits would be suggested by the CIA?
Now the White House is having the president and Condi Rice first place the blame for the Niger debacle (allowing disinformation into a State of the Union address) squarely on the shoulders of George Tenet and then later having the president say he has complete confidence in Tenet, thus conveniently keeping him in the fold. In other words, no harm, no foul. I’m tempted to say that the White House wants to have its yellowcake and eat it too. But even I wouldn’t stoop so low.
