State Official: Why We’ve Got Cold Feet on Surge

As the new Baghdad security plan gets underway — otherwise known as phase I of the surge — State and Defense Department officials are again at odds over the division of labor for the “build” end of the “clear, hold and build” strategy. And that’s something that, according to the military officers in charge of implementing the surge, could doom it from the start.

In Senate testimony yesterday, it was revealed that while the State Department is creating 350 new positions to support the Iraqi government during the surge, it has a manpower shortfall so severe that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is requesting the U.S. military — already overburdened — to fill up to a third of the civilian jobs. Defense Secretary Gates told Senators pronounced himself disappointed by Rice’s request; be sure that Rice will have to answer for it in testimony tomorrow before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

And that’s because of the broader logic of the surge. Both General David Petraeus and incoming Central Command chief Admiral Bill Fallon stated in their confirmation hearings last month that ultimate success in Iraq depends not on military victory, but on political and economic developments — the idea that there’s a better life for Iraqis who renounce violence. In other words, without sustained support from the State Department and other civilian agencies to improve the daily lives of Iraqis, arguably the most important aspect of the surge will never have a chance.

So why is State having such a hard time sending people to Iraq? I asked a State Department contact for a wingtips-on-the-ground perspective, and here’s his candid, off-the-cuff response.

Here’s the contact’s reply:

There are a number of reasons why State folks are not chomping at the bit for those jobs.

1. 350 positions is A LOT. To put into perspective, some HR stats on State Department authorized total numbers at various embassies (these are just State Dept. staffing):

Emb. Cairo: 183
Emb. New Delhi: 203
Emb. Beijing: 249
Emb. Mexico City: 199
Emb. Moscow: 203
Emb. Pretoria: 124

Those are the authorized numbers. The actual staffing at those Embassies appears to be 10-15% less. And I’ve just given you the largest embassies in these regions — the smaller ones would be even more severly impacted by officers moving out to go to Baghdad. And though the upper brass may disagree, I think that a lot of State folks realize that there are other important diplomatic priorities in addition to Iraq.

2. You ask about incentives. Sure, there are some. But at this point it seems that there’s a strong sense that the benefit of serving in Iraq is being watered down. By benefit, I mean promotion, recognition, etc. State folks aren’t in it for the money — and that’s the largest benefit of serving in Iraq. State is trying all kinds of other carrots in regards to future assignments & whatnot, but with so many folks serving or having served already, the likelihood of the benefits actually sticking? Seem slim.

3. Of course, there is the fact that State officers are political pragmatists as well. What happens when the administration changes? It may be that even the actual, promised benefits disappear.

4. Why would a seasoned Africa hand with fluent Swahili want to serve in Baghdad? Seems like a funny question, but given the stress context and regional knowhow is given in diplomacy, its important.

5. We all remember this moment. There may be some of us who don’t want to be there if it happens again.