Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán has become a kind of godfather of competitive authoritarianism, an autocratic visionary for the 21st century that right-wing parties around the world are seeking to emulate. Trump’s second term draws directly from his model, with the various thought leaders of that movement making their admiration plain. Orbán’s is a system in which elections continue, giving the country the appearance of democracy, but it is just that: an appearance.
Or so the thinking has gone. There is some irony in the fact that, according polls, Orbán is on track to lose reelection on Sunday to a former member of his Fidesz Party, Péter Magyar, who has won voters over by denouncing the regime’s corruption and incompetence. While it is no longer a question whether the country’s democratic mechanisms are fair, Sunday will test whether they are rigged enough to withstand the overwhelming backlash Orbán is now facing. JD Vance and Vladimir Putin are, in various ways, scrambling to save their ideological ally.
If Magyar’s party, Tisza, does win on Sunday, it could become the first step in a long process of de-Orbánization, which we have a great piece up on this afternoon. Political scientist Gabriela Greilinger walks through what will have to happen to unwind the prime minister’s grip on power. He and legions of his loyalists have burrowed deep into the mechanism of Hungarian government, and extracting them will not be quick or easy.
Many of Fidesz’s structural advantages are locked in through cardinal laws, which require a two-thirds majority to amend or abolish. In addition, Fidesz is deeply entrenched in the state, having placed party loyalists in top positions across key public institutions. A possible Tisza government will therefore first need to replace these Fidesz loyalists who were nominated to serve beyond a legislative period and could obstruct a new government’s work. This includes, for example, the fiscal council, packed with Fidesz loyalists, which can veto the new government’s budget proposal, potentially leading to snap elections.
[…]
As a result, not only the future balance of power in Hungary but also the prospects of de-Orbánization remain uncertain and will depend on the outcome of Sunday’s election. Knowing what it stands to lose, Fidesz has already begun sowing doubt about the integrity of the election and potential foreign interference — even though the Fidesz government itself poses the greatest threat in these regards. In case of an electoral defeat, Fidesz might double down on the “big lie.”
But the first step is Sunday’s election, and any potentially Trump-like efforts Hungarians might see to reverse it.
