I’ve had a slew of readers writing in and asking — or insisting — that the raid on the Baghdad home of Ahmed Chalabi and INC headquarters was, if not staged, then conducted with the intent of boosting Chalabi’s popularity by appearing to place him at odds with the American occupiers. (The idea, you might say, would be to Sadr-ize him.) Indeed, one of those notes came from someone who I’d describe as loosely affiliated with the United States military establishment and quite knowledgable about Iraq and the Middle East at large.
So could this be true?
I have no direct knowledge. I just got back from a few meetings. And I’ve had no time to make any calls yet. But I’m very skeptical of this interpretation.
I don’t doubt that some of Chalabi’s Washington supporters have encouraged him to take a more oppositional stand toward the occupation authorities to bolster his own popularity. But there are many US government players in Iraq right now. And many of them really are hostile to Chalabi.
Something quite that orchestrated would, I suspect, be far too difficult to pull-off. And are we dealing here with smooth operators? Answers itself, doesn’t it?
One other point: You only have to look next door to see what happens to American puppets after they have their fallings-out with the Americans. Clue: They don’t get embraced by the other side. In fact, that guy from nextdoor was lucky to get out of the country in one piece.
Another theory — or at least a portion of one — is contained in an article appearing this morning in Salon by Andrew Cockburn. The article points to US government suspicions that Chalabi may be plotting against the soon to be announced caretaker government, chosen by American officials and UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi.
Cockburn notes Chalabi’s continued efforts to ally himself with Shia sectarian groups in Iraq, particularly the new umbrella group he’s created, variously translated as the Shiite Political Council or the Supreme Shia Council (I’m assuming these titles I’ve seen referred to are in fact the same group).
Cockburn mentions that Chalabi’s new Shia sectarian faction includes members of Iraqi Hezbollah. And though he doesn’t mention him by name, I believe he is referring in particular to a man named Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi, a key member of Iraqi Hezbollah.
Chalabi’s dwindling number of Washington supporters have awkwardly claimed that his efforts to ally himself with Shia Islamist groups in Iraq is an evidence of their man’s ‘pragmatism’, recognizing the political realities of the country and adjusting accordingly. This is an echo of their pre-invasion efforts to explain the copious funding Chalabi received from the government of Iran, which, in case you hadn’t noticed, is not supposed to be a great friend of ours.
If you’re looking for any entertainment, any silver lining to this mess, watch the faces of the hardest core Chalabistas and watch the less and less subtle ripples of chagrin on their faces as their man more and more publicly shows how much he played them for fools.
