The revelation in last week’s National Intelligence Estimate on al-Qaeda was that its senior leadership has established a “safe haven” in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. At today’s joint House intelligence-armed services committee hearing, five defense and intelligence officials stated that the crucial factor for the development of the safe haven — which allowed al-Qaeda to rebuild its capabilities — was a ceasefire accord signed last year between President Pervez Musharraf and tribal leaders in northern Waziristan. Yet even as the ceasefire collapsed earlier this month, following Musharraf’s raid on the Red Mosque, members of his government have tried to resurrect it.
Toward the end of the hearing, the acting assistant secretary of defense for international security, Mary Beth Long, conceded to Rep. John Tierney (D-MA) that Musharraf’s government is still exploring “small agreements” with the same entities that allowed al-Qaeda to develop its safe haven.
Long didn’t seem too exercised about a return to what practically everyone at the hearing acknowledged was a failed policy resulting in a stronger al-Qaeda. She described the approach as a possible “effort to change tribal minds” reminiscent of Anbar tribal shift against al-Qaeda in Iraq. And that wasn’t very far out of tune with what the officials testified should be done in Pakistan anyway: while reserving the right to use force if the opportunity presents itself, most, like Defense intelligence chief James Clapper, said that the U.S. ultimately needs to “continue what we’re already doing,” which consists of helping train and equip Pakistani troops and giving $110 million in aid to the tribal areas. After all, it’s an approach that’s worked well so far — at least if your name is Usama bin Laden.
