RAND Report Comes Down Hard on Franks, DOD, State Dept.

As we reported, the RAND Corporation, released a long quashed critical report yesterday on the role of the White House, Defense Department and State Department in Iraq.

“After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq” was put on the RAND Corporation website late Monday. The New York Times dug into more detailed excerpts in a Blog post from their Baghdad Bureau.

The report confirms much of the conventional wisdom of our failures there, as well as what has said by military leaders— that after the fall of Saddam Hussein there were too few people, and not enough planning.

But not for lack of trying. The report states that while there was “a range of possible postwar challenges” and “suggested strategies for addressing them,” “few if any, made it into the serious planning phases” to be incorporated into Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Like the most recent study released by the Army, the RAND report also lays blame on Gen. Tommy Franks and his inopportune decision to restructure the operations in Iraq after the fall of Saddam– a tactic that made creating a “stable, reasonably democratic Iraq” more “difficult to achieve.”

On the role of the DOD in the chaos surrounding post-Saddam Iraq, the report faults the decision to make the Department of Defense the lead agency in 2003:

While this may have made sense in theory, it did not work in practice. . . DoD’s lack of capacity for civilian reconstruction planning and execution continued to pose problems throughout the occupation period.

The report also comes down hard on the “Future of Iraq” project designed by the State Department:

Press reports have widely described the Future of Iraq project as a State Department “plan” for the reconstruction of Iraq. Such a characterization is unwarranted. Plans require a concrete set of prioritized steps that should be taken in a given situation, and a plan ideally assigns responsibility for each of those steps. The Future of Iraq project did not contain any such prioritization; it was not something that could be taken off the shelf and immediately executed.