TPM on Aaron Brown tonight on CNN at 11:30 PM Eastern.
In Korea and Arabia, the Bush administration is poised to make decisions that will tell us a lot about the policy it intends to pursue and just who’s calling the shots. In the post below, I note that the North Koreans have come toward the Bush administration position — but with several significant barbs that may nullify the effect of the opening. The president now has to decide whether he’s interested in talking or not. (NB: This is being presented as an administration victory — and, to an extent, it is. But we shouldn’t forget that the multilateral talks position is still a significant climb-down from the administration’s original stance.)
There’s a similarly telling moment with Syria. (I have a column coming out about this tomorrow. So I don’t want to say too much about it now.) I doubt very much that we’re about to move militarily against Syria. This strikes me as a brush-back pitch. It is critical to our efforts in Iraq that Syria not try to Lebanize Iraq. Those are the minimum ground rules. And we need to make that crystal clear to them right now.
Our military might looks extremely credible at the moment. Also, note that Syria is now surrounded by the United States and two of its allies — Turkey and Israel, Lebanon being effectively Finlandized and Jordan a minor military power.
The critical question is, how far do we press our advantage? Do we warn the Syrians off any interference with our work in Iraq and put them on notice about chemical weapons? Or do we press on our whole bill of particulars — cutting off support for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, opening up to some sort of chemical weapons inspections, closing down offices of terrorist organizations in Damascus, a more compliant stance toward peace with Israel, etc. The devil will be in the details. But those details will tell us a lot about whether we’re pursuing a minimalist or maximalist plan for remaking the Middle East.
On a related matter, there’s a lot of chatter about how much we may or may not be coordinating with Israel on all this. Here’s one good example that we’re not — or at least not that well, if we are. Because if we really were coordinating so closely with Israel we wouldn’t let anything like this happen that made it look like we were coordinating so closely.
Israel’s hawkish Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz told the Israeli daily Maariv, “We have a long list of issues that we are thinking of demanding of the Syrians, and it is proper that it should be done through the Americans.” In various press reports I’ve seen this translated both as “through the Americans” and “by the Americans.” In the context, that subtle distinction in meaning is rather important. So I’d be curious to know more about how he phrased it in Hebrew. The long list of issues included …
… removing the threat of Hezbollah in south Lebanon; distancing long-range rockets; moving Hezbollah away from the south, up to dismantling [Hezbollah]; stopping Iranian aid to Hezbollah via Syrian ports; and halting the granting of the cover of respectability to the terror headquarters of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad based in Damascus, from which they dispatch orders and funding to Palestinian terrorist organizations.
Now each of these would be great to have happen. But this reads like something out of the more conspiratorial wing of the Arab press: Israel comes up with a list of demands for Syria. Israel gives the list to the United States. The United States masses troops on Syria’s borders and forces the Syrians to comply with the list of Israel’s demands.
If nothing else we want to do a bit better on appearances.
Multilateral? Well … kindalateral. Bush administration Korea policy got an apparent boost a couple days ago when the North Koreans suddenly (a couple days after the fall of Baghdad) announced they were willing to engage in multilateral talks over their nuclear weapons program so long as the US was “ready to make a bold switch-over in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue.” On Sunday, the president crowed — not without some justification — that his tough policy against Iraq had made the North Koreans cave.
But now there seems to be a catch.
The North Koreans say they’re okay with multilateral talks. But, according to an article in today’s Korea Herald, North Korea — and China — say they don’t want the Russians or the Japanese at table.
We probably don’t mind not having the Russians there. But according to Chris Nelson, at The Nelson Report, the US would find excluding Japan from multilateral talks “unacceptable under any circumstances.”
The rationale for the exclusion, according to the article is that the UN, China, North Korea and the United States were the only signatories to the original 1953 armistice agreement. So Russia and Japan are just not relevant to a new conference that would move beyond the armistice agreement and toward a non-aggression pact — the North Koreans key, and apparently still operative, demand.
That may work as an purported rationale. But it doesn’t really wash as the actual reason.
And there’s one other party the North Koreans and the Chinese would like to have at the table: the European Union.
The Korea Herald article quotes a Foreign Ministry official in Seoul saying that “the North wants the European Union (EU) to participate in the multilateral forum in an apparent hope that the EU may play a leading role in providing economic aid to Pyongyang.” But it’s hard not to see some extra-economic motivations behind the desire of the Chinese and the North Koreans to pull up a chair for the EU.
Here’s a good Reuters piece — moved before the news about Russia and Japan — on the hard-bargaining to come. There are some particularly good quotes from Ralph Cossa, head of the Pacific Forum, a branch of the DC think-tank CSIS. Cossa’s predecessor at the Pacific Forum was none other than James A. Kelly, the State Department point man on East Asia and the North Korea issue. (I think Cossa worked under Kelly as Executive Director before Kelly moved on to State in 2001.)
Assuming some agreement can be worked out over who’s a party to the negotiation, the question now is whether the president will have the courage to say ‘yes’ and test the North Koreans’ willingness to make a deal or whether he’ll follow the lead of those on his right flank who say that war with North Korea is essential and inevitable — the only question being whether we pull the trigger now or wait a few years.
This from an article in The Guardian …
We now also learn that before Blair departed for the March 18 Iraq debate, Downing Street had drawn up contingency plans for the withdrawal of British troops from the build-up in the Gulf and also for Blair’s resignation, should the votes have gone against him. That is how serious it was.
One of the fascinating things over the next weeks and months and years will be to find out more and more of the hidden details about the lead-up to this war.
Are those ‘foreign fighters’ in Iraq Saudis?
As the fighting winds down in Iraq, the US has started muscling Syria on a number of issues — 1) having its own stocks of chemical weapons, 2) giving sanctuary to members of the Saddam Hussein regime, and 3) facilitating or at least not preventing Syrian nationals from going to fight against US forces in Iraq.
This evening CNN has been running live coverage of a firefight in which several snipers or paramilitaries were firing on US Marines near the Palestine Hotel. The CNN reporter on the scene is Rula Amin.
Just after 6:00 PM on the East Coast, Amin was having a back and forth with Wolf Blitzer about those foreign volunteers in the country to fight the US. During that conversation she said that the Saudi volunteers were a bigger deal or there in greater numbers than the Syrians. I don’t have down the precise language she used. But the basic point was clear: there are more Saudis there fighting us than Syrians.
(Wolf, buddy, why no follow-up?!?!)
Now, obviously I don’t listen to all the coverage out of Iraq, but I don’t think I’ve heard any word of Saudis there fighting against us (though it’s hardly surprising) and certainly not that they’re the most numerous group in the country. Amin’s only one reporter, of course. But her beat is the Middle East; you’d expect reporters on the ground to have the best handle on such an issue; and she said it like she was pretty sure.
This raises some interesting questions. Certainly, we don’t want any foreign fighters there shooting at our troops. But to the extent that they’re there and we find that they’re Syrians, that gives us reason and (figuratively speaking) ammunition for going after Syria. That, of course, is where the administration is looking right now. Finding Saudis there — from a geopolitical perspective — is much less helpful. If we were finding them there, it would not surprise me that we wouldn’t be making a big deal out of it. There are many folks in the administration — particularly at the DOD and OVP — who think the Saudis are at the heart of the problem we have in the region. But for the moment we need the Saudis and they know that. On the other hand, some of their allies outside the administration aren’t so constrained. So I’m curious if we’ll hear about this from those quarters — in the standard outlets where we hear from those guys.
This article up on the Time website says that in the trashed remains of Saddam Hussein’s son Uday’s pied-a-palace on the banks of the Tigris, reporters found email print-outs addressed to firstname.lastname@example.org. They were apparently from Iraqi emigres pledging to come back and fight. The most recent was dated March 5th.
I’ve always been fascinated by the mix of alienness and similarity one finds in the leaders of countries like Iraq — really across what we used to call the Third World. Some of this is just the story of globalization — leaders and elites on the hand in death struggles with the global ‘center’ and on the other very much a part of it, invested in its culture, its modes of communication, its idioms. One sees examples of it in all the stories of raided palaces and homes of Saddam’s top lieutenants. (So now we know that Tariq Aziz sometimes barked on TV about how the Iraqis would bury us in the sands of southern Iraq and then went back to his pad and popped Sleepless in Seattle into the VCR.) On the one hand, Uday Hussein was a hideously violent thug, born and bred into Saddam’s Ba’athist police state, steeped in a virulent strain of Arab nationalism. On the other hand, he was using a free Yahoo! email account.
“I was willing to fight with a gun, but not to commit suicide.” That’s the best quote from an article by Anthony Shadid in Sunday’s Washington Post. It’s about a 22-year-old member of the Saddam Fedayeen who finally deserted several days ago in Baghdad. He fought under threat of death, though perhaps not altogether unwillingly, and then finally bailed when his superiors selected him for a suicide mission. Reading this piece you start to get the details of the picture of how the paramilitary resistance was at first unexpectedly stiff and then rapidly collapsed.
I really haven’t done the sort of systematic reading of different reporting by different reporters that would make me comfortable saying whose has been the “best.” But I’ve been consistently struck by the quality of Shadid’s, most of all the depth of the detail (which is the essence of good reporting), the material that goes beyond the standard stock interviews and anecdotes. I’m sure he’ll win tons of awards for it. Deservedly.
So far, much of the discussion of WMD has been focused on whether war-advocates or war-opponents will be vindicated retrospectively by how much is found. This way of framing the question, however, may miss the real issue — what we may never find and why. Think about the ways people might dispose of WMD or WMD precursors if they were in a big, big hurry. It’s not a comforting thought.
“My sons are 25 and 30,” Representative Barbara Cubin (R-Wyoming) said on the House floor a few days ago. “They are blond-haired and blue-eyed. One amendment today said we could not sell guns to anybody under drug treatment. So does that mean if you go into a black community, you cannot sell a gun to any black person, or does that mean because my … ”
At this point, Representative Mel Watt (D-North Carolina) cut Cubin off and demanded her remarks be stricken from the record for implying that blacks are presumptive drug addicts. Cubin declined to retract her remarks, while she said she did “apologize to my colleague for his sensitivities [italics added].” The House later voted 227 to 195 against striking Cubin’s remarks from the record on the basis of their being inappropriate. No Republican voted in the affirmative.
I’ve been so taken up with the war that I haven’t had time to make any mention of this yet. But I’m far from the first to express bewilderment that it hasn’t gotten more attention. Indeed, the Washington Post — not exactly some scrappy lefty blog — has an editorial on it in today’s paper (“Where’s the Outrage?“).
And really, where is the outrage? It’s difficult to see how anyone without pretty *#$%ed-up views on race could have said that, even as a slip. But what’s really important as far as the public square is concerned is not so much the rancid views people may have in their hearts but that they keep their mouths shut and publicly repudiate this stuff when it slips out. This Cubin seems completely unwilling to do. And her colleagues seem in no rush to make her. According to the Post, Speaker Denny Hastert said her remarks “clearly left the wrong impression.”
Clearly … And so do Hastert’s. The Post is right: where’s the outrage? If I were Trent Lott, I’d ask for a rehearing of my case, because the rules for this sort of thing seem to have loosened considerably.
What about the looting, the mayhem, and the fires? It’s clearly a bad situation. And these things get to a tipping point where they can go from looting and mayhem to something far deeper and darker which is very hard to put a stop to. Having said all this, though, I think we shouldn’t be too quick to ask why the invasion force didn’t have some sort of constabulary or plan in place to stop this. If it’s still like this in a week, it’ll be a good question to ask. But I think it is virtually inevitable that you’re going to have some period of rupture — a window of time when there’s an utter vacuum of authority — when a government like this falls under military assault.
One reason is historical, another is operational. The first is just, as we’ve noted before, the steel beam under compression finally snapping. It’s a judgment call; but to some degree it’s probably better to ride this tumult in the short-term rather than squelch it. There’s a lot of rage and clamor to be let off and better not to turn too much of it toward US soldiers trying to keep everyone in check.
The more important issue, however, seems operational.
One moment you’re in very active battle for a city. The last thing you want is thirty-thousand lightly-armed or unarmed policemen and American aid facilitators hanging around to get shot, or taken hostage or just get in way. The next moment you’re not at war and you’ve got thousands of US soldiers and marines who are — for a host of reasons — in no position to police anything but the most egregious sorts of crimes. Add to this, of course, the fact that even that dividing line isn’t so clear. We have mainly a liberated/conquered city where large-scale hostilities are at an end and the old regime is gone. But we still have irregulars or foreign fighters or holdouts shooting off occasional shots. And that makes it hard to send anything but heavily armed folks out into the field.
Add to this one final complexity. Part of the problem is that you’re dealing with a former regime that was so shot through with state-terror that it’s hard to see how many people who ever wielded “hard” authority under the old regime are going to want to show their heads again even in an interim capacity. The Army is putting out the call for police and firefighters and the people who ran the phones and water and electricity to come back to work. In the latter cases, that’ll probably work. But what about the police? I’m not sure there were people in Iraq who would fit our rather benign definition of “police.” I’m sure there were low-level folks in the security apparatus who were decent people compromised by a bad system. But I can imagine those folks wouldn’t want to show their faces just now. And do we want them keeping order for us?
It’s a tough situation, and an ugly one that we’ve got to get a handle on. Morally and under international law, we’re responsible for restoring order when it was our tanks that smashed the old, albeit hideous, order. (Isn’t this a case of the troop strength, again, being too small? Yes, I suspect so, to a degree. But even if there were a lot more troops immediately at the ready, I think you’d still have an interval of chaos like this since the sort of troops you use to fight your way in to the city just aren’t equipped for policing duties. We need to see how it looks in a week or two.) The real danger over the long-term is the sort of deeper inter-communal blood-letting which reared its head yesterday in Najaf — of which we’ll say more later. But I think we should recognize that in the short-run this sort of ugliness may have been close to unavoidable.
Following up on the earlier post, here’s an article with an inventory of the ransacked house of longtime Saddam crony Tariq Aziz. It’s a litany of artifacts which are mostly striking in their ordinariness and Western-ness. My picks for best tidbits are the the marked-up copy of Princeton Review’s “Cracking the GMAT” or perhaps the Britney Spears posters on the walls in the kids’ room. Also, here’s my most recent column in The Hill, from two days ago, on the fate of Iraq’s battlefield dead.
It’s about 12:30 AM on Friday morning and on CNN there’s live coverage of a huge number of Iraqi soldiers, ex-soldiers really, walking south toward Baghdad along an open two-lane road. The landscape looks like it might in the eastern, flatter part of Colorado or New Mexico. What’s being reported is that these were Iraqi conscripts who were stationed in positions in the north and as the Iraqi army dispersed and disintegrated they just hit the roads and headed south. They deserted. Their officers deserted them. Various other possibilities. They’re walking toward Baghdad, which is more than one hundred miles away, and then they think down toward southern Iraq where they’re originally from. Many of them are sandal-clad or even bare-footed. They don’t seem to have water or food or money. Mostly, they’re wearing civilian clothes.
It’s not even clear how much of this is true, or just who these men are. But whoever they are, there are hundreds, actually thousands of them walking south down a road toward Baghdad.
There’s all sorts of talk now of who was right and who was wrong about this or that, what will come next, and so forth. But watching this you just see the magnitude of the whole situation, the number of people on the move, displaced, with new hope, with no plan.
It’s not an analogy. But the image it brings to my mind is of slaves at the end of Civil War who headed out onto the roads looking for relatives who they’d been separated from.
It defies analysis or quips or quick insights (imagine that for TPM!). In their own way these are the most staggering images yet.
We heard a lot about “Shock and Awe” in the lead-up to this war — that is, the hammering concussions of American air power that were supposed to cow the Iraqi military if not the regime itself into submission, the swift whack of a bat that was supposed to shatter the hold of the brittle regime.
That didn’t work, of course. Loyalists and militiamen were more finely meshed into the civilian population than we thought. It took the ‘old-fashioned’ combination of armor on the ground and precision munitions from the air to grind away the Iraqi army.
But “Shock and Awe” wasn’t a misplaced phrase. We just had the date wrong. It came yesterday, with the collapse of Baghdad. And it came not in Baghdad or Kirkuk or Basra but in Cairo, Beirut, Riyadh, Amman and other capitals around the Arab world.
It’s far from the case that everyone applauded what they saw. But it seems hard to find man-on-the-street interviews that don’t carry a large measure of shock and in many cases something very like awe. (Yesterday I discussed an interview with a neoconservative in which he described the great hope of this invasion as the confrontation that it could bring about between testimonials of Iraqi liberation and the pieties and orthodoxies of anti-American arab nationalism. It was an on-the-record interview. So I can say that the neo in question was David Frum. And yesterday was a pretty good day for David’s predictive ability.) What I take most from these man-on-the-street interviews is the mix of surprise and humiliation. From Jordan there are a slew of interviews with Jordanians expressing contempt for the Iraqis dancing in the streets in Baghdad. There is something very like a sense of betrayal. This was presaged in an article from an issue or two ago in the New York Review of Books in which the author was interviewing Iraqis and Jordanians in Amman or some other Jordanian city. The Jordanians were against an invasion. The Iraqis, though regretting it, hating the prospect of civilian casualties, and insisting the Americans shouldn’t stay long, supported it. There’s a moment in the interview when the author asks one of the Iraqi women to explain the divergence of views and she says something like, “they didn’t have to live under Saddam.”
Beyond that, in these various interviews from yesterday, you see questions like: What happened to the Republican Guard? Why were we so weak? Were we lied to? We supported Saddam in spite of ourselves, knowing he was a bastard because we thought maybe he could take the Americans down a notch, strike a blow for Arab pride, and so forth. Now we’re doubly humiliated. Why are they celebrating? What happened? Why was there so little resistance? Why did Baghdad fall so quickly?
Then you see these statements which mix excitement that Saddam has fallen with shame or humiliation that it took American armor to do it and, secondarily, that perhaps they should have been more serious about the need for his fall in the first place. I think we should see very clearly the toxic potentialities of that sense of humiliation and shame.
Positive or negative, however, almost all the statements bespeak fractured if not shattered certainties. Now, it seems to me that there are a few things important to note about this. If there is one thing that history and social psychology tell us it is that ingrained idea systems can be extremely resistant and often impervious to new facts. Indeed, they can rapidly regroup and accommodate new and what may seem utterly contradictory new data. (Indeed, as good as yesterday looked and was, we should be equally careful to judge all of this on its own terms as much as we can and place these events as little as possible into the conceptual architecture of our preconceptions and imaginations.)
All of this is simply a long-winded way of saying that the window of opportunity, the window of changing expectations could prove exceedingly brief. We’re already seeing a host of things, even happening today, which could provide the building blocks of a very different image, indeed a very different reality. As the foreign media is already starting to note, the number of people who attended the statue-toppling yesterday was actually rather small — not thousands or tens of thousands, but maybe a couple hundred. Then today there is news that two Shi’a clerics were literally cut to pieces by a crowd of rival Shi’a in Najaf at the Ali Shrine. This is the steel beam in compression that the people who know this subject best have long predicted. This doesn’t necessarily nullify what happened yesterday. But it should show us how hard this is still going to be and how a very different set of images and realities could quickly push aside all the consternation those of yesterday created. Anti-war types shouldn’t let their preconceptions blind them to the palpable feelings of relief and happiness many Iraqis are feeling today. But hawks shouldn’t fool themselves into ignoring how ephemeral those images could prove.
A couple weeks ago I wrote that one of the pre-conditions for the success of democratization in post-war Japan and Germany was the shattering impact of overwhelming military defeat and the resulting shattering of confidence in the pre-war elites and ideological systems that had led the two countries into war. This could be a potentially equally shattering event. But all seems in flux and much of what is not in flux remains uncertain. The end result depends mightily on subsequent events and actions — some of which we control, some of which we don’t
Yesterday when the American flag went up on the face of the soon-to-fall statue of Saddam, I wondered the following: Clearly Centcom and the folks at the Pentagon are rightly cautious about giving any symbolic evidence or sign that this an American occupation rather than a liberation. The best example of that is the hoisting of American flags, as we already saw in Umm Qasr a week or two ago. So why do the US soldiers and marines seem to have all these American flags on the ready to hoist up?
A post that went up on the BBC this morning gives a clue.
We’ve just learned from the US marines that the US flag that was put on the face of Saddam yesterday – it was replaced by an Iraqi flag when the people shouted for that – was the flag that was flying over the Pentagon on September 11.
For a lot of the American marines, they think this war is all about defeating terrorism, they will tell you that over and over again. There is also a connection in the minds of the American public between the regime of Saddam and what happened on September 11, and apparently the flag that was draped over this face was flying over the pentagon when the plane crashed into it.
So apparently this wasn’t just any flag.
It was still a slip-up. But this puts it in a different, deeper context. It’s also one of those gives-you-faith-in-America moments to find out that the Marine who hoisted the flag — Cpl. Edward Chin — is apparently Chinese-American.
LATE UPDATE: He’s more on Chin from Abcnews.com …
“And the flag â it was on the Pentagon when it got hit on 9/11. That was the same flag, and me being from New York, it kind of all goes together a little bit. It was a team effort, which made it even better, you know,” he said.
Chin, 23, and his family are ethnic Chinese from Myanmar, formerly Burma. The family moved to Brooklyn, N.Y., when Chin was just a week old. Chin, a graduate of the Bronx High School of Science, joined the Corps in 1999 and was assigned to the First Tank Battalion at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, Calif., before being shipped off to Kuwait in January.
Two questions face us in the reconstruction of Iraq. Many more than two, of course. But, for the moment, let’s discuss these two. One is whether we should try to set up a full-fledged democracy in Iraq or fall back on the older approach of installing some sort of well-meaning strongman who can hold the country together and move slowly toward something like democracy. Then there’s the question of whether we should back Ahmed Chalabi and the INC or some other group or mix of groups. There are many people who argue that these two questions are really just one question: that supporting Chalabi means supporting full-fledged democracy and opposing him means supporting something beside democracy. This equation is simply false on a host of levels. We’ll be talking more about this, not least of which the CIA’s relationship with Chalabi. But for the moment don’t miss this piece by Gideon Rose in Slate.
Given the events of the day, I can’t help wondering whether maybe we really did get Saddam when we bombed that restaurant the other day. The regime really did seem to snap right after that, at least in Baghdad. And it seems like more than just a coincidence. On what was yesterday morning in Baghdad — i.e., the morning of the day that ended with the statue toppling — the reporters noted what then seemed like an eerie silence in the city. Even if he wasn’t killed, perhaps Saddam committed what amounts to political suicide — deciding it was time to just vanish. (Al Jazeera reported rumors that he had sought and received refuge in the Russian embassy.) Regardless of the details, something seems to have happened after that raid.
Yet another “man on the street” in the Arab world wire story, actually from the Washington Post Foreign Service, to add to the previous two posts. On this one the dateline is from Cairo, and the testimonies are more negative. But I think they’re all part of the same picture — a mix of shock, surprise, changed opinion, relief, humiliation, shame, suspicion, hope, anger. I’ll say more about this later. But tonight is set aside for paying work.
“Why did he fall that way? Why so fast?” said Yemeni homemaker Umm Ahmed, tears streaming down her face. “He’s a coward. Now I feel sorry for his people.”
“We discovered that all what the (Iraqi) information minister was saying was all lies,” said Ali Hassan, a government employee in Cairo, Egypt. “Now no one believes Al-Jazeera anymore.”
However, Tannous Basil, a 47-year-old cardiologist in Sidon, Lebanon, said Saddam’s regime was a “dictatorship and had to go.”
“I don’t like the idea of having the Americans here, but we asked for it,” he said. “Why don’t we see the Americans going to Finland, for example? They come here because our area is filled with dictatorships like Saddam’s.”
Those are just the most positive snippets, others are more dark and ominous. But, in the AP article at least, they are in the majority and they set the tone. Take a look at the whole thing.
This is heady, heady stuff. I woke up this morning to the scenes of US troops pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. This is joyous stuff, scenes of oppressed people tearing down the symbols of oppression. The question I have — it’s the critical question, I think — is how these scenes play in the rest of the Arab world. Of course, whether such scenes continue ranks pretty high up there too. But we’ll deal with that later. (Here’s a great Reuters story with on-the-street reactions around the Arab world: “Arabs Watch Hussein’s Demise in Disbelief.”) More broadly, how will it play in Europe and elsewhere? (We don’t, after all, live in Iraq. We live in the world.) Will they see this the way we do? Will it be reported in Germany and France, Riyadh and Cairo the way it’s being reported here? In one of the interviews I did for my “Practice to Deceive” article, I spoke to a neoconservative very close to the White House who described the great hope thus: if Iraqis welcome their liberation and you have a stream of books penned by Iraqis coming out over the next several years on how horrible Saddam’s regime was, perhaps the collision between this testimony and the certainties of Arab nationalist anti-Americanism will force a basic rethinking, perhaps it will break the back of those orthodoxies. If the testimonies are so clear, he supposed, perhaps Egyptians will ask themselves what could have led them to defend Saddam from a US invasion when he was oppressing Arabs more awfully than anything the Israelis ever did to the Palestinians.
The above-noted Reuters article contains at least one quote reconcilable with that view. An Egyptian engineer told Reuters: “It seemed that Iraqis were all with Saddam, now it looks like many didn’t like him. Maybe those destroying the statue are rebels against Saddam’s rule.”
This is a very good day for that hope. And if that hope is vindicated it will be a wonderful thing. I don’t think we’ll know today or tomorrow or next month or even next year. The challenges in the way of our success are vast, challenges that could quickly snuff out all of this, challenges that I don’t believe many who are guiding this effort truly understand. But today was a good day.
This evening on CNN Nicholas Kristof talked to Aaron Brown about what he had seen in his first trip into southern Iraq. (I believe he said Basra, but it could have been elsewhere.) Contrary to folks on the left who think we’ll be treated as conquerors and folks on the right who think we’ll be greeted as liberators, Kristof found a marvelous diversity, as we should probably all expect. Most are glad Saddam is gone. Many are glad we’re there. Others aren’t so happy about it. (See this Times article for a mix of appreciation and ambivalence in Baghdad.) But there seems to be a widespread suspicion — even among those who are glad we’ve overthrown Saddam — that we may be there to take their oil.
Which brings me to an op-ed column in today’s Times. A couple weeks ago, my friend Steve Clemons (check out Steve’s site to see his other articles and commentaries) came up with a novel, ingenious idea: why not divide up Iraq’s oil wealth like the state of Alaska does?
Back in the early 1970s Alaska set up the Alaska Permanent Fund, which holds the revenues from oil leases as a public trust, with a portions of the interest paid out every year to every citizen of the state.
Now, obviously this model couldn’t be applied directly to Iraq. After all, I imagine you’ve got a certain percentage of the population — those Bedouins our troops saw occasionally while they were streaking north — that isn’t part of the cash economy. But the concept is one that really merits attention. After all, if we give the Iraqis their oil in the way the Saudis have theirs — i.e., hoarded by a few moguls — how much will it mean? So we shouldn’t just be careful not to give any sign that we’re grabbing up Iraqi oil revenues — by cutting in all American companies, say — but actually go a whole step further and really spread the wealth in a way it’s never quite been spread around in all the Middle East. That could be truly revolutionary. (On the general issue of not squandering our apparent military victory with foolish triumphalism, see this excellent column by Robert Kagan in Wednesday’s Post.)
As Steve notes, giving all Iraqis a very concrete, material stake in the new regime would go a long way to securing a political constituency for the new order. Doing something analogous in post-war Japan played a key role in the success of our democratization efforts there. In its own way, pulling oil wealth out of the hands of parasitic states and oligarchic princelings could have as positive an effect as bringing something like democracy to Iraq.
Again, it won’t be easy. The Alaska model would be very hard to introduce. And it would probably need to be adapted to Iraqi conditions. But you can say pretty much the same things about bringing democracy to Iraq. And we’ve already signed on for that. So, really, why not?
In National Review Online, Stanley Kurtz has an interesting critique of my recent Washington Monthly article “Practice to Deceive” and a critique of … well, I guess of me. Let me just take a moment to respond to three of Kurtz’s points.
The first is regarding the concept of deception, which is central to the article. Kurtz says that none of the democratizing vision of the neocons is a secret. It’s actually been written about widely in the conservative press. Yes, I agree. And I’ve said as much repeatedly. Kurtz implies that my saying it in TPM means that I’m backtracking from my argument. But this isn’t true. The argument I am making is that there are many thoughtful and intelligent people who believe this is a good thing to do. Go back and read the last year of The Weekly Standard and see. Neoconservatives in the administration share these views but also know that such a grand plan would be almost impossible to sell to the American people, so they really haven’t tried. Instead they’ve sold regime-change in Iraq along the more modest lines of Saddam’s WMD and his relationship to terrorists. It’s good sleight of hand to say I’m accusing people of a “conspiracy” because, by common consent, people who believe in “conspiracy theories” place themselves beyond the pale of purely rational argument at some level. Kurtz is using the phrase, not me. I’m saying something more prosaic and direct: the administration hasn’t been honest about its intentions or goals. That may be true or false. But it’s a direct allegation, not a conspiracy theory.
The second issue is what we might call Bush White House Kremlinology. Has President Bush really signed on to the maximalist democratizing, regime-change vision? Aren’t there more moderate neoconservative voices, sometime-Realists like Condi Rice, and even those like Colin Powell who never bought into the idea in the first place? Yes, of course there are. Frankly, that’s one of my great hopes. Such as it is. Indeed, Kurtz too expresses some concern about the aims of the more maximalist democratizers. The reason I think it is both accurate and fair to focus on those with the maximalist position is that it is this group that has consistently played the winning hand in pretty much every key intra-administration debate leading us to where we are today. So when we look at the future and where we’re going with this I think it’s more realistic to look at Cheney, Rumsfeld and their advisors rather than positing a point equidistant between Cheney and Powell and believing that that point is our final destination. I hope for the latter. But it’s a hope not based on experience.
The third point is more broad-ranging. Kurtz wants to portray my position on the war as a symptom or example of a deeper Democratic malady. To put it metaphorically, he’s saying that in the heart of even a seeming Joe Lieberman lurks a secret Ron Dellums. Not so fast. This is another way to polarize and thus simplify the argument, setting up straw men, and so forth. And Kurtz is only able to do it by asserting that I say things I’ve never said: that I’m indifferent to the issue of nuclear or other WMD proliferation, that I’m possibly a down-the-line UN man, or just generally that because I didn’t think we should start this war when we did that suddenly I’m Teddy Kennedy or Walter Mondale and have recanted views expressed on Iraq and other issues over the last two years. (If I wanted to be snarky I guess I could note that my indifference to nuclear proliferation is rather belied by my repeated insistence that North Korea’s resumption of plutonium production must be confronted immediately — hopefully through diplomacy, but through war if necessary — even as the administration has repeatedly expressed openness to the idea of allowing North Korea to become a nuclear power.) None of this is true. I just didn’t think we should pull the trigger when we did or, under the circumstances then prevailing, perhaps ever. It was a tough call, which I’m content to live with. Subsequent events may show I was right or wrong. Either is certainly possible. But the decision hardly makes me a dove.
More broadly, Kurtz is saying I’m in the camp of those who think nothing really changed after 9/11, that the nexus of terrorism, WMD proliferation, high-technology, globalization and the rest of it can just be handled by the same old-fashioned strategies we used ten, twenty or forty years ago.
This isn’t true, of course. But let me finish on this point of ‘everything changing.’ Much did change with 9/11 and more generally with the less visible changes that preceded and presaged it. But neither neoconservatives nor neoliberals have really changed all that much. Many of the same formulas and approaches the neocons now advocate are ones they advocated a half a dozen years ago when the bete noirs were China and others — greater skepticism toward Europe, more comfort with unilateral assertions of force, skepticism about the whole concept of deterrence, and so forth. The more things change, etc. The ‘everything changed’ argument often really boils down to ‘everything we were always for turns out to be right’ and if you don’t agree then you’re not serious about 9/11.
Neoconservatives and neoliberals just have different basic ways of approaching foreign policy — neither necessarily more hawkish or dovish. That was true before 9/11 and it’s true now. Who’s right has to be hashed out on the merits. Just referring to WMD or 9/11 won’t do.
Now that we’ve gotten most of the invasion done with, it’s time to get down to the real battle: whether or not to install Ahmed Chalabi as the next king of Iraq.
As you’ve probably heard, a couple days ago the Pentagon airlifted Chalabi and a slew of his troops into southern Iraq for purposes which weren’t entirely spelled out. Pentagon critics assumed it was to give Chalabi a leg up on other oppositionists.
The striking thing was that this didn’t just seem like a surprise to the press, but also to much of the US government. Here’s some more interesting reporting from UPI about an internal government report the CIA circulated last week detailing their arguments against Chalabi’s suitability to be the “Iraqi Karzai.”
The weird thing about Chalabi is that — whatever you think of him — he has a way of getting different arms of the US government fighting against each other. As a sympathetic Washington-based Arab journalist told me last year, “The problem with those guys [i.e., the hawks] is they’re so fascinated by Ahmed. They want to wind a policy around Ahmed. Find a policy. And let’s see where Ahmed fits in it. And at the same time, you have the State department, the opposite side, they want to make a policy but make sure he’s not involved in it.”
Let me comment briefly on Lawrence Kaplan’s new article in TNR about the Rumsfeld position. This is basically a brief for the Rumsfeld, or Pentagon appointees’ position. But it’s a good brief, certainly the most sophisticated and convincing I’ve seen. Still I think Kaplan conflates several issues and sets up at least one straw men.
The heart of Kaplan’s argument is contained in this paragraph …
There is a kernel of truth here. But few of these critics bothered to entertain a simpler and legitimate rationale for the war planânamely, that it was drawn up with an eye toward political as well as military goals. Principal among these goals was the need to fight the war as a “war of liberation,” which meant placing an extreme emphasis on minimizing Iraqi civilian casualties. Rumsfeld’s plan also had to contend with the danger of large-scale American casualties and thus precluded a months-long massing of American forces in Kuwait, where they would have been vulnerable to Iraqi attack. Finally, to limit Saddam Hussein’s ability to launch missiles, torch oil wells, and create mischief in southern Iraq, it called for a rapid advance to Baghdad and, hence, a smaller force. The alternatives being proposed by the generals today may arguably have enhanced the military effectiveness of the campaign. But they also might have led to political catastrophe.
There are several points here — either explicit or implicit — that are very worthwhile. The first is that Rumsfeld and the Army have built up quite a record over the last two years. So there’s a lot of pre-existing hostility in the air. What’s more, there is a natural tendency for the military to see wars in more purely military terms, i.e., in terms of securing military objectives and force protection rather than in terms of broader political aims.
So, to take an extremely crude, overstated formulation of this viewpoint, military planners might say that instead of a lightning strike, we should have mounted more lumbering, overwhelming force, a long run of bombing, and just crushed all resistance wherever it was before we sent our guys in. If there was one town where a lot of fedayeen were, just pulverize it and sort out the details later, rather than having a bunch of Marines have to get into a bunch of nasty firefights.
I’m not saying anyone was actually suggesting this. But this is the sort of trade-off Kaplan is talking about. We have enough power to just crush the place. But if we bring all our power to bear we’d end up … well, crushing the place. And that would be terrible for our actual political objective, which is to have most Iraqis feel like, on balance, our invasion was a good thing.
This is a good argument. And I don’t doubt that there were some planners — focusing on force protection and the need to mobilize more overwhelming force — who pushed for a more military and less political strategy, with a more massive and devastating use of force.
But I’m not sure how on-point this is.
As nearly as I can tell, the main argument from the retired military folks was not that our rules of engagement were too stringent or that we didn’t hit with enough force. The argument was that our ground forces were stretched too thin or that there was too little armor. They had a hard time protecting supply-lines, beating down resistance in the South, etc. Frankly, these seem like two separate issues, don’t they? The prime argument was simply that we had too few troops on the ground. Would having the 4th ID there on the ground in Iraq have led to a more punishing, politically-counter-productive war or just greater flexibility and an ability to react to the resistance from paramilitaries which eventually developed?
Another argument Kaplan puts forward is the massing of large concentrations of troops in Kuwait and whether that would have left them vulnerable to some sort of preemptive WMD attack from Iraq. If true, this would be a good argument for going in with a minimum of troops at first and then bringing in more later. What’s not clear to me about this argument, however, is whether having, say, one-hundred-thousand more troops on hand would have made them that much more vulnerable. A slow build-up of big numbers of concentrated troops is an invitation to various sorts of asymmetric attack. But we already had more than a couple hundred thousand sitting there around or in the general vicinity of the southern border. Would a third more have presented that much more tempting of a target? It doesn’t seem that way to me. But I put this forward only as a supposition. It does seem like a key issue to resolve to evaluate the overall good plan/bad plan debate.
On balance, Kaplan makes some very strong points. But there seems to be an apples and oranges issue at the center of his argument.
More later on this …
Two questions which one keeps hearing: Have we drawn up plans for an invasion of Syria? There are plans and plans, of course. It’s in the nature of Joint Staffs to have plans on hand for even most improbable of wars. (If I remember correctly, the US had battle plans even for going to war with Britain as late as the years between the first and second world wars, though perhaps it was earlier than that. Point being, it’s the job of the military to have plans on hand for even the most hard-to-conceive eventualities.) But in this case I mean real plans. The second is whether Ariel Sharon will use this moment to strike at Syria — not an invasion but taking out various stuff from the air. I’m not hearing this from doves or the establishment types, but from the hawks.
There are a slew of reports and images coming out of Iraq tonight, all of which point in one sense or another to the regime crumbling or just melting away. This is not the end of resistance but the end of anything you could credibly call a government in any but a nominal sense. There are some expressions of hostility, many of popular jubilation or simply relief. But some of the most visible images are of what can only be called indifference to our presence: namely, the looting. Looting was always to be expected. This is a country that’s been ruled by terror for at least two generations. And even if we had every person in the US military on the ground in Iraq we still wouldn’t be able to effectively police the place in the immediate chaos surrounding the fall of the government.
There do seem to be at least some instances of vengeance killings occurring. And there are sure to be many more. But what’s really striking is the fairly calm, unhurried looting. This is what happens in a society when everything has been held in check by terror and so many of the bonds which make up society have been slowly ground away.
Some time back I was talking to an Iraqi emigre based in the Washington. (My understanding is that he’s now in Kuwait readying to go back into the country.) This is not one of the name “oppositionists,” but someone who always struck me as the most authentically democratic of the Iraqis I talked to for my various reporting. He had a much less monochromatic sense of at least the original Baath party than we usually hear today, rightly or wrongly, in the US. And he spoke of the “excessive dictatorship” Saddam Hussein had imposed on the country and the way it had ground away all of what we usually call civil society. Ironically, sanctions had only tightened his grip and still furthered the process, giving the state — in its thuggish, smuggler, aid-administrator guise — even greater control over people’s lives.
Obviously, “excessive dictatorship” is a funny phrase to hear from someone I’m calling a democrat. But what he meant was this grinding down of institutions and allegiances and affiliations — everything but the autocratic state and the individual. One of the other distressing points was his description of how this breaking down of civil society had left only those sorts of leaders who could call on atavistic or sectarian loyalties. And this is what you see in most of the Iraqi opposition leaders, the Shi’a Islamists, the Kurdish parties, the various exile groups which have only a very uncertain command over any allegiance inside the country. Many of them, of course, the US essentially created.
The challenge is the lack of national institutions around which you’re going to be able or not going to be able to build some sort of unified state.
Even war with all its horrors has its small eddies and backwaters of farce and hilarity. One of those now comes in the stream of press conferences being held by Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, in which he claims that Iraqi troops are beating back American forces, retaking the airport and perhaps even giving the GIs merciless wedgies in more light-hearted moments. These press opportunities, of course, are originating in a city which is now apparently subject to daily incursions by US troops, a jarring contrast of almost Monty Pythonesque dimensions. One almost expects before too long to see Al-Sahaf — with some embedded reporter’s videophone in hand — broadcasting from an American POW camp, telling listeners that reports of Iraqi battlefield reverses are vastly overstated.
Ralph Peters, a retired Army officer, had a good column on Saturday in the New York Post belying the claims of the Rumsfeld cheer-leading squad …
Unable to admit that errors of any kind might have been made in planning the war, OSD spokespersons engage in a combination of outright lies, attacks on critics and highly selective memories.
As far as events proceeding according to plan, well, if your plan is vague enough, with a sufficient number of “branches and sequels,” as the military puts it, even defeat might be presented as having been anticipated.
Fortunately, we are not faced with failure. The outcome of this war, if not the timing of that outcome, truly is not in doubt. But events did not proceed according to plan.
The much-heralded initial airstrikes failed and are now conveniently forgotten. The ground campaign assumed the lead from the first days of the war – which definitely was not according to the plan. And the number of ground forces permitted to the theater commander was inadequate by any honest measure.
These are some of the more choice comments. But read the whole thing because Peters lays out a strong and broad-ranging argument. And he speaks with authority.
I think I can say with some certainty that Washington is the only city on the planet these days — at least last night, it was — where one can go to a party and hear someone do a Karaoke rap about regime change and the grand plan to democratize the Middle East. And, lest there be any question, no, the performer wasn’t TPM. Actually, it was pretty good, though I was more than a bit inebriated at that point. So who knows? In any case, I still wasn’t convinced, but I was entertained.
Earlier in the evening — a few hours after getting ambushed on Fox News — I got asked this question: setting aside the potential deceptions involved in getting the US into this broader conflict and the possible costs, do you believe in the goal? In other words, do you believe a) in the goal of democratizing the Middle East and b) that rooting out illiberal governments in both their authoritarian and fundamentalist forms will strike a fundamental blow against terrorism itself?
It’s a tough question on a number of levels. With some equivocation, I said I did. But then, I said, I would have to say I am also in favor of developing warp drive engines. And yet I think that’s a case where the investments required are sufficiently steep and the prospects of success so distant that I’m not sure I think we should really get into it too seriously at this point.
I don’t want to suggest that democratizing every country in the Middle East is as daunting a challenge as creating the technology for faster-than-light space travel. What I do mean, however, is that agreeing to a goal is only one step in a debate. Do you have any good plan to achieve it? What are the costs? Does the public get a say in the matter? Do the advocates of the liberal experiment themselves have deeply illiberal tendencies?
A colleague of mine and I have had a running conversation going for the last couple months over what a neo-con is, what’s the defining trait. Some definitions are biographical and others ideological. Few seem entirely satisfying. And one would want a definition that could be accepted by their supporters and opponents alike — to make it a basis for further discussions. As I noted in the article in the Monthly, I think one trait is a tendency to let advocacy get the better part of honesty, to privilege, shall we say, morality over facts. But the deeper trait or definition I’ve come up with is this: Neocons are people who don’t like muddling through — both in the good and bad senses of what that means.
One other point on this running discussion. I mentioned yesterday an article in Policy Review by Stanley Kurtz. Don’t miss another article in the same issue: “Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change,” by Ken Jowitt. This is a critical appraisal of the Bush administration’s foreign policy doctrines, and one I think only another conservative could write. It’s entertaining and insightful.
Tod Lindberg is the editor of Policy Review, and he is also one of the people I interviewed at length for my Monthly article. I don’t agree with Lindberg’s stance. But far from being one of the deceivers, he is someone who I think fully recognizes the difficulty of a years-long effort to reform and democratize the Middle East and entirely frank and the costs and dangers. He just thinks we have no choice. In any case, it’s a credit to him and Policy Review to have published this dissenting piece. This is an important debate to have so long as we can have it openly and on its own terms.
Mickey Kaus has a good run-down on the good-plan, bad-plan debate. And I think his conclusions are pretty much on the mark. His points are especially well-taken on Turkey. There’s one small point he neglects, though. Don Rumsfeld actually thought we could proceed even without the forty-thousand or so British troops now in the theater.
At around 5:15 PM EST this afternoon I’ll be going on Fox News to debate whether it’s okay for anyone to question or criticize Don Rumsfeld’s war-planning. We’ve gotten contradictory intelligence reports so far about whether I’ll be greeted as a liberator or an invader over at the Fox studios. So, to prepare for all possible contingencies, I’ll be bringing heavy armaments as well as candy for the children. You know, it always makes sense to be prepared: Hope is not a plan.