Recapitalization wins
The recapitalization of Bank of America today, along with their
announcement to temporarily halve dividends, resulted in a fairly
substantial stock price decline. Simple-minded analysts will look at
this and see their expected returns over the next few years drop, both
as a result of the dividend cut and the dilution of their shares.
However, this is arguably the wrong way to think about things. Over the last year, banks have talked about their commitment to existing shareholders; but when this supposed commitment to non-dilution of existing shares results in total loss of equity value and bankruptcy, it's hard to play this out as being in the interest of shareholders. Would you rather hold diluted shares, or worthless shares because the company went under?
Many of the failed and troubled banks have attempted to raise capital over the past year (with Bear Sterns being a notable exception). But banks like Lehman Brothers raised only modest amounts of capital (less than 20% of I recall correctly). And the reluctance of banks, in general, to recapitalize following losses left them with only one other option: liquidating assets. And the assets they were liquidating were frequently some of the few profitable units. No one had any interest in buying the rest.
And it's not that no one tried to sell them. It's just that everyone recognized that they were one of the more risky portfolio components, and attempted to liquidate them in an attempt to lower weighted portfolio risk. If the banks could actually hold these securities through their maturity, they might survive. (This is one of the reasons the government won't do as badly as the headlines would have you believe with the purchase of so-called toxic assets -- this is a special case in which market value is below fundamentals.) But when you finance long-term assets with short term debt, you have a temporal risk mismatch, and you can sometimes get screwed.
The liquidation of prime assets meant that while companies might have acquired modest amounts of capital, the weights on the riskiest parts of their portfolio went way up. And there's substantial reason to believe that these weights were not properly updated, and that the volatility of the most risky portfolio components was drastically underestimated.
My opinion: If you're a bank regulator and you want to trust Value-at-Risk, go ahead. Investors beware. The entire idea of this kind of risk assessment is to ensure that banks possess enough capital to survive rare, disastrous events. But Value-at-Risk varies with the business cycle, and this primarily because the historical data used to predict portfolio risk is, in general, pretty short. So if you're using two years of data to try to estimate the likelihood of an event that's going to happen once every thirty years, this seems pretty stupid, right? And this is where derivatives are useful: we don't have decades of data. If you wanted to be careful, you could get a better idea by looking at historical fundamentals and the ways in which fundamentals would have affected derivatives at the time, had they existed. But you don't want to be careful: you want your end-of-year bonus.
Postscript: Apologies for the diversions. It's a known personality flaw.
Disclaimer: Advice is roughly worth what you pay for it. And don't mail me a check. I really wouldn't have an answer for you if you paid me!
However, this is arguably the wrong way to think about things. Over the last year, banks have talked about their commitment to existing shareholders; but when this supposed commitment to non-dilution of existing shares results in total loss of equity value and bankruptcy, it's hard to play this out as being in the interest of shareholders. Would you rather hold diluted shares, or worthless shares because the company went under?
Many of the failed and troubled banks have attempted to raise capital over the past year (with Bear Sterns being a notable exception). But banks like Lehman Brothers raised only modest amounts of capital (less than 20% of I recall correctly). And the reluctance of banks, in general, to recapitalize following losses left them with only one other option: liquidating assets. And the assets they were liquidating were frequently some of the few profitable units. No one had any interest in buying the rest.
And it's not that no one tried to sell them. It's just that everyone recognized that they were one of the more risky portfolio components, and attempted to liquidate them in an attempt to lower weighted portfolio risk. If the banks could actually hold these securities through their maturity, they might survive. (This is one of the reasons the government won't do as badly as the headlines would have you believe with the purchase of so-called toxic assets -- this is a special case in which market value is below fundamentals.) But when you finance long-term assets with short term debt, you have a temporal risk mismatch, and you can sometimes get screwed.
The liquidation of prime assets meant that while companies might have acquired modest amounts of capital, the weights on the riskiest parts of their portfolio went way up. And there's substantial reason to believe that these weights were not properly updated, and that the volatility of the most risky portfolio components was drastically underestimated.
My opinion: If you're a bank regulator and you want to trust Value-at-Risk, go ahead. Investors beware. The entire idea of this kind of risk assessment is to ensure that banks possess enough capital to survive rare, disastrous events. But Value-at-Risk varies with the business cycle, and this primarily because the historical data used to predict portfolio risk is, in general, pretty short. So if you're using two years of data to try to estimate the likelihood of an event that's going to happen once every thirty years, this seems pretty stupid, right? And this is where derivatives are useful: we don't have decades of data. If you wanted to be careful, you could get a better idea by looking at historical fundamentals and the ways in which fundamentals would have affected derivatives at the time, had they existed. But you don't want to be careful: you want your end-of-year bonus.
Postscript: Apologies for the diversions. It's a known personality flaw.
Disclaimer: Advice is roughly worth what you pay for it. And don't mail me a check. I really wouldn't have an answer for you if you paid me!
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Thanks for the interesting, informed commentary, something that is largely lacking here with the obsessive McCain and Palin posts which, by-and-large, pass on information already published by other sources.
October 6, 2008 8:47 PM | Reply | Permalink
It all sounds sensible the way you frame it, but aren't you ignoring the magnitude of the problem? While Paulson talks about shoring up failing financial markets with a cash injection of 700 billion dollars, there's the small matter of 50-60 TRILLION dollars in non-valuable credit default swaps to consider. It's an incredibly bad joke. It's like an optical illusion: Bank of America appears to recover while the foundations of the economy rot and crumble beneath it.
We're talking about putting a Band-Aid on a shotgun wound. Whatever appears to be happening, there's a macro failure occurring in the background. My advice? Buy diamonds or precious metals (or cans of soup) and don't fall for the sleight of hand. This is only the beginning, and we're a long, long way from recovery.
October 6, 2008 9:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
It's a reasonable point, but I think that the $50-60 trillion number is something the media likes to hype up; its economic meaning is less clear. The amount you see in trillions is the notional amount. The fact that the media even mentioned the amount as being tens of trillions of dollars is pretty misleading.
First, let's think about a typical interest rate swap. You enter a three year interest rate swap wherein you agree to pay 4% interest (fixed rate) and your counterparty agrees to pay the yield on a 10-year T-bill. You do this every six months for three years. If your six month period came up now, you'd owe the guy 50 basis points given that 10-year zero coupon T-bills are yielding 3.5%. The question is: how much do you owe him? Hence the notional principal amount: you owe him the difference in the interest rates times the notional amount. So if the notional amount is $10,000,000, you'd owe him $50,000.
Second, there are infinite varieties of swaps. You could create a swap on almost any return. You could include caps in one or more directions. You could swap the average return on a bunch of assets. There's no limit, really. If you agree and you can find a counterparty who is interested, you're good to go.
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are a bit more complicated, but not much. One party, the protection buyer, agrees to pay the counterparty, the protection seller, some fixed percentage of the notional amount at periodic intervals in exchange for protection against default. Maybe you're holding $10,000 in some corporate bond. You want to insure it over a given time period. You, the protection buyer, agree to pay some percentage of the notional amount (the $10,000) in exchange for insurance against default. So if you're paying 2% annually on a three year contract, you'll pay $200 a year for what is basically insurance. In the case of default, the contract is terminated. But your counterparty doesn't exactly owe you $10,000. You have a third party come in and figure out exactly how much the defaulted bonds are worth. Maybe the company whose bonds you were holding went into default -- they still have some assets, even if their assets are less than their liabilities and they are technically insolvent. Suppose the third party figures out the defaulted bonds are worth $7,000: you get $3,000. Again, you're not getting anything close to the notional amount.
Third, the total notional amount outstanding is frequently even more meaningless than I've already described. Trades are made and frequently reversed very quickly. After you enter into a swap, you're stuck, or you're going to have a huge legal mess. Easiest thing? Take the opposite position in an identical swap the next day. If not much has changed, your net risk exposure is zero. But your notional principal could be in the billions.
I'm not saying it's not a problem. But it's a bit hyped up. IMHO.
October 6, 2008 10:01 PM | Reply | Permalink