Josh Marshall

Josh Marshall is editor and publisher of TalkingPointsMemo.com.

Articles by Josh

Does Ray LaHood (R-Ill) know something we don't?

Yesterday, at an editorial meeting with a local newspaper, Lahood was asked about the impact of Iraq on next year's election.

LaHood replied that the US is on the verge of capturing Saddam and once that happens the resistance will collapse. When a member of the paper's editorial board asked LaHood if he knew something they didn't, the five-term congressman -- who sits on the House Intel Committee -- said "Yes I do."

So is LaHood just blowing smoke or does he know something we don't?

Put me down for smoke. But read this and make your own decision.

Now that's odd.

When I flipped on my computer this morning, CNN was running a breaking news alert that Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri had been captured. al-Duri was not only one of Saddam's top deputies. He has also allegedly been a key organizer of the post-war resistance.

Now, twenty minutes later, no follow-up story, no alert, no nothing.

Looking at the other news sites, it seems that Kirkuk is rife with rumors that al-Duri was captured in a raid last night and that one member of the IGC, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, made a vague statement seeming to imply that he had "There was a major action against a highly suspicious objective last night in Kirkuk and it is very possible that Izzat Ibrahim has been captured or killed."

Did CNN jump the gun? Presumably we'll know more later this morning.

A couple months ago I was in a book store in New York leafing through the latest offering from Laurie Mylroie, a book called Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror.

I've been thinking a lot about the book business of late and the all-important issue of timing. And with that in mind I couldn't help chuckling when reading over the liner notes and seeing gems like this: "Combining important new research with an insider's grasp of Beltway politics, Mylroie describes how the CIA and the State Department have systematically discredited critical intelligence about Saddam's regime, including indisputable evidence of its possession of weapons of mass destruction."

Indisputable evidence ... Hmmm, you think, maybe this is a dust-jacket that could have used a touch of last-minute rejiggering.

(Amazon says the book came out on July 29 of this year. So you figure those lines were probably written a couple months earlier, just as they were tipping over the edge from mere foolishness to demonstrable ridiculousness, but not quite there yet.)

Of course, in some circles, the jarring nature of disconnects between claims and facts ain't quite what they used to be. But whatever you think of Mylroie's work (which posits Saddam's role in everything from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to the Oklahoma City bombing to 9/11 to the Anthrax attacks), it has been extremely influential with the war-hawks who were the primary architects of our Iraq policy. And that's a frightening thought on a host of levels.

For more on Mylroie, her work and her influence, read Peter Bergen's new piece on her in The Washington Monthly.

Alas, one for two. Today a three judge panel quashed subpoenas which would have compelled House Majority Leader Tom DeLay and Congressman Joe Barton to testify in the Texas redistricting (i.e., double-dipping) case.

There were, of course, two instances this year of mid-decade redistricting that came, shall we say, straight outta Washington.

Because more seats were at stake and the process prompted more theatrics, the double-dipping in Texas got much more attention. But the same thing happened in Colorado. And today the State Supreme Court said the whole sorry episode was unconstitutional.

"If [congressional] districts," said the ruling, "were to change at the whim of the state Legislature, members of Congress could frequently find their current constituents voting in a different district in subsequent elections."

Now for the court case in Texas, where we're still waiting to hear whether House Majority Leader Tom DeLay will be able to avoid being deposed about his role in the redistricting battle.

My posts have been sparse for the last few days in part because of the holidays but also because I am poring over a stack of books about empire for an upcoming essay. And with these various thoughts about empire swirling through head, reading this article about our ever-evolving Iraq exit strategy plan in tomorrow's Post is an exercise in sinking feelings and dark humor.

The essence of the story is that the plan for a political handover that we announced just weeks ago is already on the fast-track to dead letterhood.

And it's happening because the plan is being gamed by Iraqi political leaders who've clearly got more power on the ground than we do.

Our lack of effective power, as opposed to main force, of which we've got plenty, is what's pushing us to get out of the country in the first place. But our efforts to get out have further weakened our position, thus diminishing our ability to get out on our own terms. It's a vicious cycle, and as difficult to remedy as it is vicious.

Back on Wednesday the Post had a piece about how Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani was largely responsible for scuttling our original plan to appoint the drafters of the constitution, rather than have them elected.

Now he's come out against the new plan for electing these folks through a complex series of town caucuses and called instead for direct nationwide elections.

It's pretty hard to fault Sistani's positions on democratic procedural grounds. But the bigger point, again, is our impotence in the face of his expressed views.

He's calling the shots; we're not.

And then there's the Interim Governing Council, the IGC.

The greatest deceit perpetrated by the architects of the war turns out to have had nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction or ties between Saddam and al Qaida. The profoundest deception was the claim that the IGC was designed to be a transitional governing authority when in fact, as is now becoming clear, its true purpose was to provide a sort of dark, Falstaffian comic relief to balance out the ominous backdrop of postwar Iraq.

Much of the jockeying we're now seeing involves efforts by the IGC to perpetuate its power into post-occupation Iraq even though -- with the exception of the Kurdish faction leaders -- few of its members have any serious base of political support in the country or, to put it bluntly, any armies on hand for when things really get fun next fall.

So, while the real players jockey for position and await our departure, these boneheads are trying to use the paper power we've given them against us in order to hold on to authority even after we leave.

That's just great.

Here's a prime example ...

Even if the United States can broker a compromise formula, council members are still trying to retain their leverage by arguing that the council should remain as a second legislative body, the equivalent of a senate, an idea likely to ignite further controversy, Iraq experts warn. Alternatively, the council could try to slow the process, hoping to preempt the latest U.S. plan.

Their leverage ... Like I said, dark comic relief. We can't even get our puppets in line.

Undemocratic or imperfectly democratic upper houses of parliaments usually justify themselves by their partial remove from the bustle of democratic politics or their identification with national unity or ancestral wisdom or some such thing. Think the British House of Lords or at the turn of the last century the United States senate. Such arguments are always strained. But why the council we installed in the first months of the occupation should play this role is a little hard to figure.

And then another nice passage ...

One way or another, key council members are vying either to shape the transition or ensure the council remains intact and a powerful body, as the U.S. plan envisions. Because many of the 24 council members probably would not fare well in open elections, they pressured Bremer to establish an indirect three-step system to select a new national assembly, which in turn would pick a prime minister and cabinet, a process so complex that many Iraqis and U.S. experts doubt it will work.

A former U.S. adviser to Bremer described the plan as "an insane selection system of caucuses, like the Iowa caucus selecting those who will vote in New Hampshire."

The U.S. plan effectively gives the Governing Council a kind of remote control because it will have the deciding vote in local caucuses that will pick a national assembly.

All of this adds up to the essential ridiculousness of the moment: On the homefront, the president is shaping his political campaign around the notion that we shouldn't show weakness and we can't cut and run. Meanwhile, it's clear to pretty much everyone in Iraq that we're doing both.

And they're acting accordingly.

Here's the headline and tease on <$NoAd$>the front of the CNN website as of 2:50 AM on Saturday morning ...

Retailers Seeing Holiday Sales Increase: Millions of people Friday got an early start to one of the busiest shopping days of the year, lining up outside stores long before the sun came up. Analysts expect stronger sales this holiday season but that discounts won't be as deep as last year's. There are reports that luxury retailers are even raising prices.

Here are the first few grafs of the lead story on the CNN Business news website ...

Rain and leaner discounts greeted shoppers across much of the nation on Black Friday, a day that marks the official start of the holiday sales season.

"Early indications show that store traffic and the promotional activity is at lower levels than last year at this time," said Kurt Barnard, an independent retail consultant. "I wouldn't be surprised if many retailers try to get away with selling merchandise at full price."

Barnard anticipates that same-store sales -- or sales at stores open at least a year -- will rise between 1 percent and 3 percent for the three days including Black Friday and the coming weekend.

"That's not fantastic by any means," Barnard said.

A bit of a disconnect?

If you're involved in all sorts of iffy financial transactions, don't get into a messy divorce.

Someone didn't mention this sage advice to Neil Bush.

Now it turns out that Bush is not-too-distantly connected to New Bridge Strategies, the outfit President Bush's right-hand-man Joe Allbaugh set up to play Iraqi contracts game.

Here's the run-down.

It turns out Neil is Co-Chairman of something called Crest Investment Corporation. Whatever it is Crest does, it pays 60 grand a year to get a few hours a week of advice from the President's ne'er-do-well brother on how to do it.

The other "co-chairman and principal of Crest," reports the Financial Times, "is Jamal Daniel, a Syrian-American who is an advisory board member of New Bridge Strategies ..."

The New Bridge website says that before Daniel started up Crest he was in the international real estate biz and also "has extensive experience in structuring investing in energy and oil and gas projects throughout the U.S., Europe and the Middle East."

Will the surprises never cease ...

For a few days I've been saving string, as the phrase goes, on what may turn out to be the most interesting, even the most important, phase of the Texas redistricting battle.

As all the parties have always known it would be, the whole issue is now the subject of a court case -- largely over claims that the new districting dilutes minority voting power.

Now, the plaintiffs in the case have subpoenaed Tom DeLay and fellow Texas Congressman Joe Barton to give sworn testimony in the case.

Lawyers for DeLay and Barton are trying to have the subpoenas quashed, arguing that no court has ever required the testimony of sitting congressmen in a redistricting case.

The lead attorney for the plaintiffs has responded that DeLay's testimony "is clearly legally significant to this case because, unlike any member of Congress in any prior redistricting process, he unquestionably played the central role in Texas redistricting in 2003."

The centrality of Delay's role is demonstrably true.

A three judge panel has set a hearing for Monday to decide whether DeLay gets to avoid discussing his role in what happened this summer.

You call Iraq an intelligence failure? Have I got an intelligence failure for you!

That's the explanation for the fall of France in Ernest May's fascinating revisionist study Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France.

Here's the TPM review from May 2002 ...

I really, really, really want to recommend a book to you. It's called Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France and it's by Ernest R. May, a highly respected diplomatic historian. There are two reasons why this book is so good. The first is that it is just a marvelously engrossing narrative of one of the most pivotal moments of the 20th Century: the lead-up to the Second World War and particularly Hitler's lightning victory over France in May and June of 1940. It's just a very polished, compelling World War Two book and a very good read. But it's much more than that.

May begins with a question that most of us would probably not imagine really was a question. That is, why did France lose?

From the newsreels, many histories, and the mythology of appeasement you'd get the impression that this was just a given, that Germany was strong and armed-to-the-teeth and France was unprepared and weak. But this just wasn't the case. May makes very clear that France (and especially France and Britain together) were both quantitatively and qualitatively stronger and better prepared for war. Simply put, on balance, they had more stuff and better stuff.

So then the question: why did they lose and lose so quickly?

May provides a complex series of answers to this question. But the key ones are easily stated.

One, the French intelligence services were inefficiently organized and intelligence gathering was not well wedded to policy-making. In other words, though France had better intelligence assets in Germany the French weren't particularly good at analyzing and making use of that information. Nor were they particularly good at crafting policy based on intelligence.

Two, the French military, though professional and well-equipped, was organized around a series of what one might call risk-averse doctrines which made it cumbersome, immobile and less agile and quick to react than it should have been.

May uses diplomatic, military and intelligence sources from the French and the German sides to assemble a very clear view of how the two diplomatic and war-fighting machines operated. May's readily apparent depth of familiarity with these sources is little short of breath-taking.

All of this combined to allow the weaker power, Germany, to defeat the stronger one, France.

What makes this book valuable to read today is that May makes a convincing case that our Western military and intelligence services are much more like that of the French circa 1940 than the Germans. And that's sobering.