Josh Marshall

Josh Marshall is editor and publisher of TalkingPointsMemo.com.

Articles by Josh

From a late report in the Associated Press: "U.S. Marines announced Thursday an agreement to end a bloody, nearly monthlong siege of Fallujah, saying American forces will pull back and allow an all-Iraqi force commanded by one of Saddam Hussein's generals to take over security ... The agreement, reached late Wednesday night, was negotiated between U.S. forces and Fallujah representatives, including four Iraqi generals. The deal provides for a new force, known as the Fallujah Protective Army, to enter the city Friday and provide security. It will consist of up to 1,100 Iraqi soldiers led by a former general from Saddam's military, Lt. Col. Brennan Byrne said."

Champing at the bit ...<$NoAd$>

SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Okay, the President had his usual briefings this morning. And the meeting with the 9/11 Commission started right on time, at 9:30 a.m. this morning. And they are continuing to meet right now. QUESTION: Who is in the meeting, for your side? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Hang on. I'll come to questions. I'll go through my routine here. Other than that, all I have is that I'm briefing at 1:15 p.m. and State Department is briefing at 12:30 p.m. That's all I've got. Now, go ahead. QUESTION: So who is in the meeting, from your side? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Well, I'll go over everybody that's in there. You have all 10 commission members, you have one member of the commission staff present. Then you have the President and Vice President; Judge Gonzales is there, and two staff members from the Counsel's Office are there as well. QUESTION: Who are the staff members? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I'm not going to get into the names of the staff that's present. QUESTION: Why? QUESTION: Why? QUESTION: Why? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Just, Judge Gonzales. They're lawyers on the White House Counsel staff. I know you all want to call them and talk to them afterwards, but I'll just say, two members of the White House Counsel staff. QUESTION: No, that's not why, we just want their names. QUESTION: For God's sake, this is a matter of historical record. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: It's a private meeting, Helen. QUESTION: It's not a private meeting, it's a public meeting. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I just told you who is present. QUESTION: It's doing the nation's business. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: These are two members of the Counsel's Office that have been working closely with the September 11th Commission. QUESTION: Why the secrecy? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I don't look at it that way. QUESTION: But we do. QUESTION: It is a good question. It is an historic moment. This is -- in a public event. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I'll talk back with these individuals and see if -- but -- QUESTION: Just for the record, really, just for the record. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I'll talk back with these individuals, but I'm not in the habit of just going and naming every staff members that attend all these meetings. QUESTION: But this isn't just another meeting. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I understand. QUESTION: You're the spokesman for this White House, and you should give us the basics. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I'll check with those individuals, but I'm not going to get into naming staff members without their -- QUESTION: Why did the White House feel there was a need for three staff members -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: -- without talking to them about it. QUESTION: -- versus one for the commission of 10 members? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Well, you have 10 commission members there, too. So you have a lot of members of the commission. These are two staff members that have been very involved in working on these efforts. QUESTION: What is their purpose, Scott? Are they there to record what takes place? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No. QUESTION: Are they there to advise the President -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No, I'm sure they'll be taking notes. QUESTION: -- or Judge Gonzales -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No. QUESTION: What is the purpose? What is their purpose? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Because they're two members of the Counsel's Office that have been very involved in working on these issues with the September 11th Commission. And they'll be there taking notes, just like a member of the commission staff will be there taking notes. QUESTION: So they're actually there more to record what happens. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Well, take notes, yes. QUESTION: Are there two note takers? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Yes, I expect both of them will be taking notes. I expect members of the commission will be writing information down, as well. QUESTION: You said there was one note taker. Is there an official note taker or are these both -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I said there would be at least one member yesterday, and then yesterday afternoon when I was updated, I said that there would be two members of the Counsel's Office present. QUESTION: Who are they? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Helen, I'll check with them. And I don't want to go and just name them without talking to them first. QUESTION: Where are they all sitting? Is the President at his desk? Where is the Vice President? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: The President and Vice President are sitting in the chairs in front of the fireplace. And the commission members are sitting on the couches and in chairs in the Oval Office. QUESTION: Who got the couches? How did they decide who got the couches? What, did they run in, and -- (laughter.) QUESTION: Why in the Oval Office? Why not in a place where all of them could sit at a table? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Well, the President has lots of meetings in the Oval Office. He meets with world leaders there on a regular basis -- QUESTION: There's 10 members of the commission. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: -- and this is a similar setup. Well, it's like yesterday, when we met with -- when the President met with Prime Minister Persson of Sweden. You have several members of the staff -- of each other's staff in there. You have the ambassadors and you have other members of staff in there. And they all sit around on the couches and chairs. That's where we sit when those meetings take place. It's a similar setup to that. QUESTION: Scott, are we going to hear from the President today? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Look, if there's any change in the schedule, I'll keep you posted. QUESTION: So does that mean maybe? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No, I'm not ruling anything in or out at this point, but we'll keep you posted, obviously, on the meeting. QUESTION: What does that mean? What are your plans to read this out in some way, or give us your take on what happened? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: One, don't expect a readout on the discussion. I think I've kind of indicated that over the last few days. This is a private meeting. But let's let the meeting take place, and then we'll go from there. QUESTION: But we could hear from the President. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I'm not ruling anything in or out, David. We'll keep you posted. QUESTION: Scott, what was the preparation prior to this? How many times did the President and Vice President together meet with the White House Counsel? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I provided a general description of what he did to prepare for this. And I talked about how over the last couple of days he continued to visit with members of -- the President continued to visit with members of the White House staff -- specifically Condi Rice and Andy Card and Judge Gonzales, and that he looked over materials and documents that were provided to him by the Counsel's Office. QUESTION: But specifically, what did he and Judge Gonzales talk about, because if he's just taking notes today, he already knows what the President apparently is going to say. SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Well, one, April, keep in mind that a lot of this occurred two-and-a-half and three years ago. And the President wanted to refresh his memory and look over documents from that time period to make sure he can provide the commission as complete account of events as possible. I mean, this is a good opportunity for the President to sit down with members of the commission and talk with them about the seriousness with which we took the threat from al Qaeda, the steps we were taking to confront it and how we have been responding to the attacks of September 11th. The President believes their work is very important, and it is very important to helping us win the war on terrorism. He's pleased to sit down with the commission and answer their questions so that they can provide the American people with as thorough and comprehensive a report as possible. And that's what's going on right now. QUESTION: Scott, a follow-up to that real quick. I know it's been a couple of years, but it was such a poignant time for this administration. What does he really need to be refreshed on? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: April, this is two-and-a-half years ago. Of course he wanted to look back at the documents to make sure that he's providing the commission as complete an account as possible about the events prior to September 11th, the events on September 11th. And I think that that's -- that anyone would want to do that prior to sitting down and visiting with the commission. QUESTION: But in news interviews, he was able to go off and just rattle off the events. But what specifically -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Well, I'm sure that -- well, I'm sure, April, that they have some specific questions going back to that time period, and we're talking about two-and-a-half, three years ago. QUESTION: Scott, will the White House release a photo of this session this morning? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I don't -- I don't anticipate that. QUESTION: Why not? And also, did the President say anything before he -- before he went into -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Yes, the meeting is going on right now, Terry, so I don't -- QUESTION: Did he say anything to you or anybody else before he went in about how he felt -- SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No -- QUESTION: -- or what he was feeling? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No, he was looking forward to it. Like I said, he's pleased to sit down with the commission. I talked to him this morning, and he -- the way I would describe it, he believes their work is very important to helping us win the war on terrorism, that the President's most solemn responsibility is to protect the American people. And that's the way in which he looks at this, that he wants to do what he can to help the commission piece together all the information they've been provided access to so that they can complete their work in a timely manner. He wants to -- he looks forward to seeing their report and he looks forward to seeing their recommendations and seeing if there are additional steps that we can take beyond what we are already doing to win the war on terrorism. QUESTION: Did he and the Vice President open with statements? Did they plan to open with statements? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: It's going on right now, Wendell. That wasn't the plan. That wasn't the plan. QUESTION: It was not the plan for them to open with statements for the committee? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: No. QUESTION: Scott, what time is the next event on the President's schedule today? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: He's got some events scheduled this afternoon, some meetings that he has, I know. He meets regularly with members of his Cabinet department. I think Secretary Ridge is coming this afternoon, two something, 2:30 p.m., something like that. And he's got some other staff meetings and personnel meetings, things like that. QUESTION: Will the President be able to explain why the bin Laden family was flown out of the country right after the event? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: I think that that matter has already been discussed and addressed previously, Helen. QUESTION: And also why the FAA didn't go up? SCOTT MCCLELLAN: Helen, I don't know what questions the commission is going to be asking. The President looks forward to answering their questions.

More soon ...

It's amazing what counts as a 'conspiracy theory' these days.

Last week, in my column in The Hill, I described how the war crimes tribunal in Iraq is being run by Ahmed Chalabi's nephew, Salem. And at the same time Salem is in the Iraqi contracts business with, Marc Zell, the former law partner of Doug Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, whose office has oversight over doling out Iraqi reconstruction contracts.

(This article on the tribunal by Robert Collier in the San Francisco Chronicle, which I hadn't seen when I wrote the original column, is quite good.)

This week, in a letter to the editor, David Epstein, a former member of the law firm Feith & Zell (the firm in which Doug Feith and Marc Zell were the two named partners), writes in and says the following ...

“I danced with a man who danced with a girl who danced with the Prince of Wales.” This line from a 1920s song came to mind after reading Josh Marshall’s April 23 attack on Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith (“Dictatorship ended, cronyism is doing nicely”).

The “conspiracy theory” is that Ahmed Chalabi is on the Iraqi Governing Council, his nephew Salem returned to Baghdad and he is seeking to do business in the reconstruction of Iraq. The article reports that Salem Chalabi is doing business with Mark Zell, who was once in the law firm of “Feith and Zell PC” and who uses the Internet name of “fandz.com.”

So there is the dance.

In fact, Feith withdrew from the practice of law when he went to the Pentagon in the summer of 2001. Upon his withdrawal, his name was dropped from the firm name.

The remaining attorneys disbanded at the end of 2001, going in a number of different professional directions. How do I know? I was a member of the firm for 10 years.

So Mr. Zell kept the Internet name. Few people outside the law firm probably knew that this jumble of letters, “fandz.com,” ever had an association with Doug Feith. It is not a brand name. It is not “Coca-Cola.” Moreover, the issue is not what either Messrs. Chalabi or Zell are doing or what Internet name Mr. Zell uses. The suggested challenge is to the conduct of Doug Feith. The article does not offer a scintilla of evidence about any improper conduct by him.

I don't know what all this razmataz is about <$Ad$>the URL of the website. It strikes me as a diversion from the point.

But what's the 'conspiracy theory' here exactly?

More and more, it seems, in neoconservative circles in Washington, a 'conspiracy theory' is an assertion or argument one simply doesn't like. The phrase 'conspiracy theory' is added on to the response as a sort of literary slur.

So let me try this one again: the nephew of America's one-time favorite to run post-war Iraq probably shouldn't be the one who runs the war crimes tribunal that sits in judgment over Saddam. If he does, he probably shouldn't also be in the reconstruction contracts business with the ex-law and business partner partner of the top Pentagon appointee whose office a) drew up most of the policies for the occupation and b) has oversight over doling out the contracts.

I understand that well-meaning people are sometimes importuned to write such letters on behalf of those who aren't in a position to respond themselves. But how is that a 'conspiracy theory' exactly. It seems more like pointing out the obvious.

NBC has a new story out this evening which reports that members of the Iraqi National Congress in Iraq are currently being investigated by the Iraqi police for abduction, robbery, "stealing 11 Iraqi government vehicles" and "assaulting police by firing on them during a search".

These stories have been around for some time (in addition to accusations of car-jacking), though I think this is the first time I've seen them reported -- at least in a mainstream publication.

One more detail I hadn't heard thus far is that, according to NBC, an arrest warrant has been issued for the INC's chief of intelligence. My question is why there's no American arrest warrant for the INC's chief of intelligence.

But I guess that's another story.

We'll have more on Chalabi tomorrow and his ongoing tussle with the King Abdullah of Jordan, including some interesting stuff on wire intercepts.

I must confess to being slightly baffled by James Risen's piece in Wednesday's Times on Doug Feith's Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, the shop which had Michael Maloof and David Wurmser trying to find ties between terrorist groups across sectarian lines as well as ties between al Qaida and states like Iraq.

Elements of this story have been reported previously, particularly by the Washington Bureau of Knight-Ridder.

But what the Times presents is almost entirely the group's apologia for their own work. One can write a story from various perspectives of course. But from the vantage point of April 2004, the take Risen takes leaves the story a tad incomplete. It's rather like writing a narrative about interagency battles in 2002 in which those claiming the most maximal views about Iraqi WMD are valiantly fighting the forces of bureaucratic fuddy-duddyism to bring the truth to light.

An interesting story, no doubt -- but rather incomplete without some discussion of the fact that the fuddy-duddies turned out to be right.

The article's only clear statement on the underlying facts of the matter is this paragraph ...

The C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies found little evidence to support the Pentagon's view of an increasingly unified terrorist threat or links between Mr. Hussein and Mr. bin Laden, and still largely dismiss those ideas. Foreign Islamic fighters have sought haven in Iraq since the American-led invasion and some Sunnis and Shiites have banded together against the occupiers, but the agencies say that is the result of anger and chaotic conditions, not proof of prewar alliances.

That's quite an agnostic view. Risen seems even to imply that the influx of foreign fighters into Iraq since the war somehow validates the group's pre-war arguments about ties between the secular Iraqi government and al Qaida.

On the other hand, there's choice passages like this ...

"I think the people working on the Persian Gulf at the C.I.A. are pathetic," Mr. Perle said in an interview. "They have just made too many mistakes. They have a record over 30 years of being wrong." He added that the agency "became wedded to a theory," that did not leave room for the possibility that Iraq was working with Al Qaeda, and that "they went to battle stations every time someone pointed to contrary evidence."

So all's not lost.

More in a bit on James Risen's piece in Wednesday paper about the Maloof/Wurmser shop under Doug Feith at OSD. But first, before you do anything else, look at this graphic that accompanies the article.

First, look at the graphic. Later we'll ponder why Feith, et al. still have jobs.

There was an interesting note a few days ago on Ruy Teixeira's blog, commenting on the recent Ipsos-AP poll. I'd heard there was something like this in the poll. But reading Ruy's post jogged my memory ...

First, consider the question of whether the Iraq war was a mistake. You know when more people than not starting thinking a war was a mistake (remember Vietnam!), the incumbent administration is in real trouble. And Ipsos now has the first example of this. They asked the question: "All in all, thinking about how things have gone in Iraq since the United States went to war there in March 2003, do you think the Bush administration made the right decision in going to war in Iraq or made a mistake in going to war in Iraq?" The response: 49 percent mistake/48 percent right decision. When Ipsos asked the same question four months ago, however, they got a lopsidedly positive reply: 67 percent right decision/29 percent mistake. Quite a change.

Note that this question specifically mentions "the Bush administration"; they also asked the same question with "United States" substituted for Bush administration. That question returns a more positive reply: 57 percent right decision/40 percent mistake. Interesting how the specific mention of the Bush administration apparently moves people toward the "mistake" judgement.

Ruy goes on to note that, at least from this poll, growing numbers of Americans think a) the war was a mistake and b) that it will lead to more <$Ad$>terrorism rather than less.

I've been giving this matter a lot of thought recently. And if John Kerry is going to win this election, he will have to make it, in large measure, an election about accountability.

The president seldom any more makes a positive argument for how things have been handled up till this point. He doesn't admit mistakes, certainly. But what he does and doesn't say is telling.

Most of the president's speeches amount to a) My heart was in the right place and, b) The past isn't what's important. Where we go from here is what's important.

(Look at his ads and you'll see he's making little attempt to make a positive case for himself.)

His partisans chime in with something similar, quickly dismissing any discussion of what's happened up until this point -- all the many mistakes made over expert advice counseling against -- and arguing, militantly, that all the matters now is who has a better plan on where to go from here, etc.

This is certainly true, to an extent. But there's that double matter of accountability. Accountability first, just as a matter of principle. But at some point you have to ask whether the crew that has gotten so much wrong -- making almost every mistake makable in Iraq -- is really the team to get things back on track, to walk the situation back from the precipice. As in so much else in life, we predict the future based on past performance. And if you look at what's happened over the last eighteen months, I think that's a very hard argument for the administration to confront.

Some are now arguing that to point these things out is to engage in a sort of grand Monday morning quarterbacking, judging everything with the benefit of hindsight, the hollow prize reserved for those who don't get 'in the arena' and all that.

That doesn't add up by a longshot. This isn't some replay of the 'Best and the Brightest', a case where the most experienced minds and the best ideas took us off in some foolish direction. These goofs weren't just predictable but quite clearly, widely and volubly predicted (the Wolfowitz-Shinseki set-to was repeated endlessly across the board). What happened was the folks with their hands on the levers thought they knew better; only they were wrong.

Making that argument requires some rhetorical dexterity. And the opposition -- i.e., Kerry -- does have to show that they, or rather he, could do better. But given what we've seen, that really should not be that hard.

Perhaps someone can help me with this.

Based on this article which ran today in Salon and emails I've exchanged today with veterans who are familiar with what these records should look like, apparently President Bush didn't release his complete military service records even though the White House repeatedly said he did.

What gives?

I fear this is becoming another example of my press colleagues' deep-seated corruption.

I've never quite understood all the arcana of the Bush Air National Guard story, so I never know quite what to make of new reports. But there's an article out in Salon on Tuesday which makes a pretty straightforward case that the 'complete' service record the White House released last February, actually wasn't complete at all.

Here are the key grafs ...

The president and his staff are doing a very good job of convincing the public he has released all of his National Guard records and that they prove he was responsible during his time in Alabama and Texas. But the critical documents have still not been seen. The mandatory written report about Bush's grounding is mysteriously not in the released file, nor is any other disciplinary evidence. A document showing a "roll-up," or the accumulation of his total retirement points, is also absent, and so are his actual pay stubs. If the president truly wanted to end the conjecture about his time in the Guard, he would allow an examination of his pay stubs and any IRS W-2 forms from his Guard years. These can be pieced together to determine when he was paid and whether he earned enough to have met his sworn obligations.


Unlike lawyers, journalists pay little attention to concepts like chain of custody for evidence. In the case of the president's Guard records, whoever possessed them and had the motive and opportunity to clean them up is a critical question. When Bush left the Guard about a half year early to attend Harvard Business School, his hard-copy record was retained in a military personnel records jacket at the Austin offices of the Texas Guard. Eventually, those documents were committed to microfiche. A copy of the microfiche was then sent to the Air Reserve Personnel Center in Denver and the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis. Those records are considered private, and they cannot be released to anyone without the signature of the serviceman or woman. The White House has never indicated that Bush has signed the authorization form. And this is what prompts unending suspicion.

The documents given to Washington reporters were printed from one of those two microfiches. According to two separate sources within the Guard who saw the printout and spoke with me, the microfiche was shipped to the office of Maj. Gen. Danny James, commander of the Air National Guard Bureau in Arlington, Va. James' staff printed out all of the documents on the film and then, according to those same sources, James vetted the material. Subsequent to being scrutinized by James (who commanded the Texas Guard and was promoted to Washington by Bush,) the records were then sent to the White House for further scrutiny prior to release to the news media.

This is a considerably different process from what was practiced by Sen. John McCain during the 2000 presidential campaign ... McCain signed a release form, and his entire record, a stack of papers more than a foot tall, was made available to reporters without being vetted by the campaign.

Needless to say, the aforementioned <$Ad$>James is the same James who is accused of assisting in scrubbing the paper copies of the president's record back in 1997 -- a charge that is of course roundly denied, but which is also discussed at some length in the Salon piece.

Now, as I say, I just don't know the details of all this well enough any more to make a judgment about these various claims and accusations.

But why exactly can't the president just release his records the way McCain did?

And, is that story about James getting a chance to go over these files true? If it is, I'd say some scribblers in town got suckered.

Big time, as the vice president would say.

So what to make of this new Iraqi flag that the IGC apparently sprung on the country today -- to near universal disapproval?

The big complaint on the streets of Baghdad seems to be that a) it looks too much like the flag of Israel --- you can see the old and new Iraqi flags along with the Israeli flag down on the right hand side of this article in the Post --- and b) that the words "Allahu akbar" were removed.

Frankly, looking at the thing (and, again, you can see it here) I have to wonder whether the biggest problem isn't that it's just one of the lamer flags I've ever seen. But, I suppose, let's stick to substance.

If there weren't so much blood and history and human tragedy on the line with all this, the stuff these characters come up with would almost be funny. I mean, what were they thinking? Truth be told, it does look like the Israeli flag. I don't think there's any getting around that, especially when viewed in context.

In an ideal world, of course, maybe that wouldn't be a problem. But people's difficulty getting it through their heads that we don't live in an ideal world has already gotten us into a fair amount of trouble in the country. True, they didn't replace "Allahu akbar" with the 'Sh'ma'. So I guess we can be grateful for small favors. But we're not exactly dealing with a receptive audience here, now are we?

In any case, back to the flags ...

If you look at the flags of the various Arabic-speaking countries (scroll down on this page to see), they're strikingly uniform. Most have some mix of green, red and black. Some lack one of more of those three colors. But overall they're quite uniform.

I think there are only two members of the Arab League whose flags have any blue -- Djibouti and Somalia. And Somalia isn't even an Arabic-speaking country, at least not primarily.

In any case, judged against the flags of pretty much all the other Arab states, this one sticks out like a sore thumb -- or mabye a pale blue thumb, but same difference.

The Associated Press gets it pretty much right when it says, "The new design not only abandons the symbols of Saddam's regime. It also avoids the colors used in other Arab flags: green and black for Islam and red for Arab nationalism."

But, really, why would worry about that, since Islam and nationalism don't seem to have very big audiences over there anyway?