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Josh Marshall

Josh Marshall is editor and publisher of TalkingPointsMemo.com.

Articles by Josh

Looking over the day's news, my strongest impression is a curious sort of deja vu. Military planners have been thinking this through for years. And when I spoke to a number of them last year to write an article about a war against Iraq, I tried to draw them out on precisely this issue. What will be easy? Which parts will be hard? Which parts of doing this worry you the most?

Most everyone agreed that we'd roll up the south pretty quickly. (Despite all the rough news of the last couple days, that's pretty much been borne out.) And then we'd come up to Baghdad with a massive coalition army. And then the big question would be answered. Would the regime fold? Or would Saddam have enough loyal Republican Guards to pull us into a really ugly fight for Baghdad?

That's always been the question and it looks like we're about to learn the answer.

This was always the question that worried military planners. I also did my best to put this question to the more zealous hawks.

Jim Woolsey was pretty straightforward. He thought we might possibly avoid a pitched battle for Baghdad, but thought the possibility was very real and that such a confrontation would be very bloody. This from my interview with Woolsey last April ...

It could well end up that Baghdad will be a big battle ... This could be a bloody and very bad thing ... It may be that the uprising will spread even among the Republican Guards and he'll lose out very quickly. But I think we would have to count on having to fight for Baghdad ...And that could be a bloody undertaking. But it was a bloody undertaking to fight the Battle of the Bulge and for the Russians to take Berlin in 1945 and I don't really see any alternative.
Richard Perle was a good deal more cagey. I had a very hard time pinning him down on what would happen if Saddam's government didn't collapse before we got to Baghdad, or for that matter really any of the serious downside possibilities. He never seemed to accept the premise. This from my interview with him, also from last April ...
I don't think you have to go to Baghdad. At least it's not certain that you have to. I think if you've initiated activities, or at least his opponents have in the north and the south, he either accepts the loss of that territory -- which I think he is loathe to do -- or he sends that same Republican Guard out to try to reverse the situation. And when he does it is exceedingly vulnerable to American air power.

[At this point, I asked Perle why Saddam would ignore textbook military doctrine which would counsel him to fight on ground on which he was least vulnerable, i.e., in Baghdad. I also pressed him on the necessity of having some plan in place if Saddam didn't fold or send his Republican Guards out to meet us on the barren desert.]

Well, first of all, his revenues would shrivel, which is to say he would have none. His ports in the south would be gone. What does he do? Just hold up in a palace near Baghdad? Try to assert authority over the country as a whole or does he accept that he now rules the Baghdad area but that's all? I think we can put him in a situation where he's got to try to assert authority over his own territory. And when he does he's highly vulnerable, his forces are highly vulnerable. There are other ways of doing this. It's certainly not up to me to decide what strategy we pursue. But I think there are strategies that do not entail an inevitable result on Baghdad.

Soon enough, this will cease to be a matter of conjecture.

Over the weekend, I've only been able to keep up on press reports sporadically. But what caught my eye over the last two days was the failure to take the southern city of Basra. It made me think that things weren't going quite as well as the initial reports implied.

Now, in this case, it's very important to give some context to words like 'failure' or things going better or worse than expected. Over the last year I've spoken to many US military planners. And what's happened so far seems well within the range of what they considered expected outcomes. It's only that the best case scenario does not so far seem to be materializing.

Let's take Basra first. Part of the lightning approach the US is following here is to set everything aside in pursuit of getting to Baghdad and decapitating the regime. On that thinking, it's fine just to seal off Basra -- and its military capabilities -- and move on to Baghdad. One needs to be sure that it's sufficiently secured so as not to allow Iraqi units to circle back and attack the relatively vulnerable US supply lines on the way to Baghdad. But that's probably not too big a worry. The Iraqi Army's real bite, if it has one, is going to be in defensive actions, particularly in urban settings. The issue is not that Basra's resistance is a problem in itself. It's what it may portend for Baghdad, Tikrit and other Iraqi cities.

Basra is in heavily Shi'a southern Iraq. And it's garrisoned by the regime's least reliable troops. So if the regime's military were going to fold quickly or be overwhelmed by restive civilians, you'd expect it to be there. The fact that it hasn't makes it much less likely that that sort of happy outcome will happen in Sunni central Iraq, among the Special Republican Guards, Saddam's Tikriti tribesmen, and others closely associated with the regime. In short, Saddam seems to have a good number of troops who are willing to fight and die for what appears to be a doomed regime.

Here's a key passage from an article in today's Washington Post ...

The Iraqis holding out in Basra are members of the Iraqi army's 51st Division, not the elite Republican Guard who have been moved to defend Baghdad and were expected to put up the stiffest resistance the U.S.-led invasion. That regular soldiers have stood so long and fought has surprised some who were predicting that Basra could be taken on the first day of fighting, to provide the American-led coalition a quick victory and deliver an early psychological blow to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Now, the failure of a rapid capitulation in Basra doesn't necessarily mean the Basrans want to fight the US soldiers. It may mean there is a sprinkling of Republican Guards and still-fearsome security forces in the city who have been able to keep a reign of terror in place which has prevented any slide toward capitulation. In a sense, though, the fact is more important than the 'why.'

This is why the uniformed military wanted to do this operation with a massive number of US troops (as we do have there now) rather than pursuing the so-called 'Afghan model.' It was always possible that the regime would just fold. But if it didn't, they wanted to have on hand overwhelming force to crush such resistance very quickly.

Inspiring, chilling, haunting words out of one of the first towns of liberated Iraq ...

All through the day here, as American and British tanks and troop carriers rumbled through the town on their drive on the nearby city of Basra, the town of Safwan seemed to celebrate the collapse of Mr. Hussein's local rule with a glance over its shoulder.

Only hours before, they said, the Mukhabarat, Mr. Hussein's security force, had held Safwan in a state of near permanent terror. Even now, the villagers said, Mr. Hussein's agents were still among them, waiting, as they did twelve years ago, for their moment to return.

"There, there are Saddam's men, and if you leave me they will kill me right now," said a trembling Najah Neema, an Iraqi soldier, who said he had torn off his uniform and thrown down his gun and ran away as the American army approached at dawn.

Like many townspeople here, Mr. Neema feared that the Americans would lose their will, as they had in 1991, when an American-encouraged uprising across southern Iraq fell before a withering assault by Mr. Hussein's regime that drew no American riposte.

This from a late article by Dexter Filkins in the Times ...

Well, I was ambling through Union Square in New York City this afternoon when I happened across an ANSWER rally against the war. I stopped and listened long enough to hear about US support for the feudal conditions in Saudi Arabia and the grand educational opportunities for women in Iraq. I guess this is one of those cases of running afoul of that whole 'the truth, THE WHOLE TRUTH, and nothing but the truth' thing.

A few points. What's most striking about this war so far is the extremely heavy reliance on multifaceted psychological warfare and propaganda. Every war uses psywar as one of its elements, but seldom I think has it been so integral to the effort. This whole effort about the fate of Saddam is of course a key point. For the US, if he's dead, great. If the US can get the word out that he might be dead, also great -- since it spreads doubt about the power of the regime. If the US can coax Saddam out into the open to prove he's alive, that's still good -- since it gets him out in the open for the US to take another hit at him.

A similar logic applies to all this talk about on-going surrender negotiations with elements of the Iraqi army.

Tony Karon at Time.com has a nice, short piece on this issue.

Now, some more from the TPM archives. Last year when I was reporting the article on Iraq that I wrote in the Washington Monthly, I interviewed General Najib al-Salhi, head of the Iraqi Free Officers Movement, an exile who now lives in Washington DC. In one portion of our interview, from last May, he argued that Saddam had actually been able to convince many around him that US, privately, actually wanted him to stay in power. The mix of my transcription of the interview, combined with the fact that Salhi was speaking through a translator, makes the text a bit choppy. But I think the gist comes through ...

They are waiting for a chance from outside so they can revolt against him. Saddam also makes propaganda with his own republican guard. "Don't worry about what you see on TV" [he tells them] "I have a special relationship with the US. I am very strong with them. They want me to stay as leader of Iraq, don't pay attention to all of this, this is just propaganda. Even today America wants me to stay as leader, I have a special relationship, quietly." People really believed in that … [But] after a few of those statements President Bush [made], people started doubting if there is that special relationship. That is the crack. [But they did believe he had that special relationship with the US] … "I'm here to protect the US interests in the region. The Arabian countries and Iran … I have been told to attack other Arab countries and to put them in their place. I am here as the protector of the US interests in the region. Just ignore what you see on TV and in the media." [Then others in Saddam's circle say] "We've heard this for the past ten or twelve years. When they got him out of Kuwait, they didn't do anything. Don't waste your time. He's gonna stay there until such time until the interests of the US is finished with him."
More soon.

I want to start this morning by issuing an uncharacteristic thank you to Richard Perle, AEI Senior Fellow, Defense Policy Board Chairman and all-around international man of mystery. My thanks is for bundling his disingenuousness in such a compact and neatly manageable form this morning.

(Just as a personal note, Dick. I know we've exchanged some words and all. But I do appreciate this, because I'm trying to take a few days of sort of light duty after finishing the manuscript. And this is a great help. So thanks. Or 'mega-dittos.' Or whatever it is you guys say.)

In the Guardian this morning, Perle writes an opinion column celebrating what he sees as the end of the UN. That's fine. That's his opinion and his desire. But look at this graf ...

Facing Milosevic's multiple aggressions, the UN could not stop the Balkan wars or even protect its victims. It took a coalition of the willing to save Bosnia from extinction. And when the war was over, peace was made in Dayton, Ohio, not in the UN. The rescue of Muslims in Kosovo was not a UN action: their cause never gained Security Council approval. The United Kingdom, not the United Nations, saved the Falklands.
The structure of the first three sentences is a bit jumbled. But Perle is saying explicitly in the case of Bosnia and implicitly in the case of Kosovo that these operations were the work of 'coalitions of the willing.'

Not really. The US bombings in Bosnia were done by the US but with the implicit go-ahead by the European powers who had shown in the early '90s their utter incapacity to end the slaughter. And the follow-on occupation is a NATO operation. The much more ambitious war waged in Kosovo in 1999 was, of course, a NATO operation from start to finish, not the product of a 'coalition of the willing'. And the fact that it was a NATO operation was, on various levels, critical to its success.

This omission, I think, is not an accident. It's an intentional fiddling with the facts. The absence of UN legitimation of this exercise, as I've said many times in the past, has never been the central issue. We didn't have that go-ahead in Kosovo. And that was fine. The issue is the cavalier indifference to our historic allies and alliances. And the happy trashing of the same.

(In an earlier passage in the column, he calls NATO -- in the context of defeating the Soviets -- the "mother of all coalitions." Perle seems incapable -- even to the point of diction -- of confronting the distinction between 'coalitions' and 'alliances.' This is a topic we'll address in a later post, hopefully this afternoon or this evening.)

What we're seeing right now is a dual story, two stories which are and in a significant respect will remain independent of each other. On the one hand, things look to be going quite well on the ground in Iraq. US and UK forces are pushing easily and rapidly into southern Iraq.

Now, it's important to say that it's always been assumed that we'd push easily through this part of the country. This is the region which has suffered most under Saddam and it makes no sense for Saddam to send quality forces out into the Iraqi desert to be destroyed with ease by American firepower. The question is and has always been whether the core of Saddam's forces would put up stiff resistance in urban warfare in Baghdad and Tikrit. Having said that, from a military point of view, things could not be going much better. And I have no doubt you're going to see tons of Iraqis who are genuinely thrilled to be out of under Saddam's regime.

At the same time, there are massive protests going on in almost every country in the world right now. The heads of state of virtually every great power are denouncing us. And the major countries in Europe are discussing whether the EU should start functioning as a geopolitical counterweight to the US rather than a partner.

One thing is very good and the other is very bad. And neither trumps the other.

There seems to be a few folks who misunderstood (perhaps willfully?) my earlier post about resolution 1441. I never said the US violated resolution 1441 -- the one passed unanimously by the Security Council several months ago -- by going to war. What I said is that 1441 gives no sanction for the attack, since the countries then on the Security Council were quite clear that 1441 could only be enforced by another vote of the Security Council. The US made it very clear it reserved the right to opt out of the Security Council process altogether -- which it eventually did -- if the Security Council later acted in a way that the US administration did not deem serious. The US has that right. Some folks don't think we have that right. I think we do. I just don't think it was wise in this case.

In any case, declaring a contingent intention to opt out of the UN process is, by definition, not a part of the UN process. If there's anyone who doesn't grasp this, I've got some square pegs and round holes I'd like you to take a stab at.

Now James Taranto over at the Wall Street Journal says my "hair-splitting legal analysis completely ignores Resolution 678 of Nov. 29, 1990, which authorized U.N. member states 'to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.'"

Now, I'm all for fig leaves in their place. We used one in Kosovo, if I recall correctly. And I'm glad we did. But let's know a fig leaf when we see one. For conservatives to hang this on 678 in any serious sense is sad and unseemly. Better just to have the courage of your own unilateralism -- since unilateralism has its place -- rather than resort to this sort of feeble caviling.

If you want to read a truly cartoonish column, I've got one for you. It's a piece by Daniel Pipes in yesterday's New York Post. Pipes argues that "the Left" really doesn't care that much about 9/11 and is actually quite admiring of Osama bin Laden since his outburst is the sign of a new global proletariat rising up to overthrow the United States. The same apparently applies to Saddam. "The Left takes to the streets to assure [Saddam's] survival, indifferent both to the fate of Iraqis and even to their own safety, clutching instead at the hope that this monster will somehow bring socialism closer." Who knew?

One of the nice things about having a blog is the ability to expand on points you've made in a more formally structured article or column. So let me expand a bit on my column in the current edition of The Hill. The piece says that we're missing a key point about what made the democratic transformations of Japan and Germany successful: the vast mauling of the civilian populations that took place prior to the war.

Now, let me touch on a few points. A few people seem to think I'm saying we should kill more Iraqis in order to get good democracies. I think it's pretty obvious that's not what I'm saying. A few other folks seemed to think I was arguing that suffering under carpet bombing somehow inculcates a democratic, pluralistic sensibility. Thus one reader tried to disprove my point by noting that Eastern Europe's civilian population had it even worse than most parts of Germany and they ended up being run by Communist dictatorships. Not what I mean. Yet another idea was that I was saying that too many of the militarists were dead to reconstitute themselves. Again, not what I'm saying.

In any case, this column seems to have generated a lot of attention, so let me say a little more ...

What got me thinking about this was actually a section of my dissertation, or rather an argument that runs all the way through it. That is, the conditioning effect both of overwhelming violence and also violence used as a weapon of terror. What happened back in New England back in 17th century is obviously very far afield from what we're talking about today. Equally so, from what happened in Germany and Japan sixty years ago. Still, there are parallels. Just as shattering violence affects people, it affects whole peoples, busting up the basic assumptions and givens in a society that usually prevent thoroughgoing change.

We normally think of people reacting to violence in a rational manner. So, for instance, when you hit them they either hit back or decide you're too strong and just decide to obey. But certain experiences of violence are so total that the reaction transcends either of these 'rational' reactions. It leads to something more like, well ... shock and awe. And not just for a few moments or a few days.

There's an additional point we might add. In a very general sense we can say that the wartime governments in both Germany and Japan were run by dominant but not-previously-unchallenged factions in these countries' political orders. Basically, in each case, the authoritarian, aggressively militarist parts of the country were in the saddle. The Nazis certainly cannot be equated with Germany's older blood-and-iron Bismarckian tradition. But there were deep affinities between the two. And something similar, at least at a very general level, applied in Japan -- though I know much less about Japan's pre-war history.

These forces led both countries to utter ruin. And in both cases, the result was a profound discreditation of those forces in the respective societies, in addition to a profound malleability and openness to transformation. That result, or that perception, was mediated by our subsequent denazification programs and also a degree of moral realization of the evils committed by those regimes.

Those situations are different from Iraq because large segments of the populations of Germany and Japan were deeply supportive of these regimes -- at least at the outset -- whereas almost no one thinks Saddam Hussein has any real following in Iraq behind his security services and cronies. Whether they want their country remade by us is an open question.

One final point, some people have made the point that the Iraqi people already have lived through a profound mauling, in the form of Saddam's rule and twelve years of UN sanctions. On Saddam's rule, there's no doubt that's been a horrible mauling. How it will play out in the context of democratization, I'm not sure. As for sanctions, though, I don't think it counts in this case. My reading of analogous cases tells me that grinding hardship -- as opposed to shattering violence -- produces rage and resentment rather than the sort of transformative openness to change you had in post-war Germany and Japan.

We'll talk more about this later.

There are hawks of war, dogs of war and, alas, as always, the jackals of war. You can see them coming with their lazy eyes, cackling grins, bloody lips and long teeth. The eve of war is literally an electric time, pregnant with fear, hope, edgy eagerness, uncertainty and manic energy. You'll always find people who want to grab some of that swirling energy and exploit it for some cynical purpose. Like Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, it would seem.

As you know, a few days ago Senate Minority Tom Daschle told a union audience that he regretted that the president had "failed so miserably at diplomacy that we’re now forced to war."

This was an uncharacteristically frank remark from a congressional leader on the eve of war. But it has the saving grace of being true -- which is always a nice thing. I don't know that better diplomacy would have avoided war. But it's unquestionably true that the president's repeated diplomatic foul-ups, goofs and course-corrections got us into a very bad situation and forced us into war on a very poor geo-political footing. I'm extremely happy to see that Daschle has crisply refused to retreat from that statement one bit.

That is especially so in the face of opportunistic grabs from across the aisle. There have been all manner of nasty comments from Republicans, criticizing Daschle, calling on him to apologize, and so forth. And that's fine. Anyone can criticize, just as Daschle has criticized the president. (We won't even get into the fact that many of these self-same Republicans said almost identical things when Bill Clinton sent American troops into battle.) But then comes Dennis Hastert, head of operations in the other body, who says that Daschle's "comments may not undermine the president as he leads us into war, and they may not give comfort to our adversaries, but they come mighty close."

Like I said, he's pulling some of that awful energy out of the air and using it to score a few cheap points -- the Speaker of the House suggesting that the Democratic leader in the other body may be giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Almost needless to say, Senator Daschle is a Vietnam-era vet, Air Force intelligence, if I remember correctly. Hastert, during the same years, was otherwise occupied.

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