P8kice8zq6szrqrmqxag

Josh Marshall

Josh Marshall is editor and publisher of TalkingPointsMemo.com.

Articles by Josh

If you think the White House doesn't have a plank with George Tenet's name on it, read this.

We noted yesterday that Colin Powell told reporters that the Niger uranium charge "was not standing the test of time" and thus dropped it from the presentation he gave the UN on February 5th. We further noted that given the timing of the State of the Union speech and the preparations for the UN presentation, that the time span over which the evidence didn't stand up stretched from January 29th to February 1st. Now The New Republic's Spencer Ackerman is reporting that the State Department's intelligence bureau, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, sent Powell a detailed memo in March 2002 stating that the Niger-uranium charges were, in its opinion, false. (They came to this judgment without seeing Joseph Wilson's report which, separately, helped scotch the story at the CIA.) "We knew it was important," an analyst who worked on the I&R report tells TNR. "The [Niger] issue might have traction, and so we wanted him to know what our opinion was."

Look, I'm as big a Star Trek fan as the next guy. And I try to think outside the box. But I was assuming that the test of time referred to linear time.

A couple days ago, Andrew Sullivan clipped this damning passage from a new Vanity Fair article on Howell Raines ...

Worse, Raines would not let facts get in the way of a story he had ordered up or a point he decided to make. "Howell wanted a thought inserted high in one of my stories," says a metro reporter. "The only problem was, it wasn't true. Mind you, this was on my beat, a beat he didn't really know about. I said to the editor who was the message-bearer that it wasn't true, and it didn't belong in the story, period. A while later he came back to me and said, 'Well, you're right, but Howell wants it anyway.' It became clear that the editor had not fully conveyed my arguments to Howell, because he was afraid to. I said, 'F--- that -- I'll tell him myself.' And he literally seized my arm and said, 'You don't want to do that.' And ultimately the editor-intermediary and I compromised on a version of what Howell wanted that was just vague enough not to mean much, but still close enough to a falsehood to make my very uncomfortable."
Remind you of anyone?

An apt observation from &c, The New Republic's blog ...

WHEN YOUR ZONE GOES BONE DRY: We've taken our fair share of shots at Howell Raines. But say this for the former New York Times executive editor: You'd certainly be able to tell from reading his paper that the Bush administration was embroiled in its first major foreign policy scandal. By contrast, the Times' actual coverage of the Niger uranium hoax has been virtually non-existent under interim executive editor Joe Lelyveld--save for a single David Sanger piece earlier this week, written mostly on the basis of an Ari Fleischer press conference. Pretty much the only place you can consistently read about that scandal in the Times these days is in the paper's the op-ed pages. Is it too much to ask that the paper put a single investigative reporter on the beat? (Or, if there already is one, then how bout an investigative reporter who produces a piece every once in a while?) Under Lelyveld the paper seems to have lapsed into its prior stupor as the official, but barely readable, paper of record.
Too true ...

The president's partisans can't seem to decide whether the CIA didn't tell them what they knew or whether what they knew was bogus. Along those lines, here's Cliff May's opening salvo in the smear-Joseph-Wilson campaign in National Review Online. May's final line reads: "In other words, Wilson is no disinterested career diplomat — he's a pro-Saudi, leftist partisan with an ax to grind. And too many in the media are helping him and allies grind it." In response to May, Wilson tells TPM: "So those are the talking points. Good to know. Not worth responding to. The article stands, the administration has made the acknowledgement. The story is not, and never was about me. It is and has been about who put the statement in the State of the Union. I am not going to rise to bait that is clearly designed to resurrect the notion that I am the story. I am not. The story is the story."

A reader points out to me this passage in Colin Powell's Thursday press briefing which I'm embarrassed to say I hadn't yet noticed. A momentary, but revealing departure from message ...

I think the President in the State of the Union address had this sentence in there and it talked about efforts on the part of Iraq to obtain uranium from sources in Africa. There was sufficient evidence floating around at that time that such a statement was not totally outrageous or not to be believed or not to be appropriately used. It's that once we used the statement and, after further analysis and looking at other estimates we had and other information that was coming in, it turned out that the basis upon which that statement was made didn't hold up. And we said so. And we've acknowledged it and we've moved on. [emphasis added]
Holding people to momentary, extemporaneous phrasings is often unfair. But in this case I think Powell's first characterization was probably closer to his true views. The uranium charges cleared the "not totally outrageous" bar, but not much more than that. Powell wanted to apply a higher standard. Now he's holding the bag.

I have to tell you that I'm stunned by how pointed and personal this Niger-uranium controversy is becoming, and so quickly. Condi Rice gave a fifty-minute briefing on Air Force One today in which she explicitly sought to pin the blame for the entire matter on CIA Director George Tenet.

Those are strong words, I grant you. But I don't think there's any other way to characterize what she said. Her comments are the sort that make it difficult, though by no means impossible, for a DCI to remain in the government's employ.

Here are a few clips from the AP's version of the story ...

Bush's national security adviser specifically pointed to the CIA and said it had vetted the speech. If CIA Director George Tenet had any misgivings about that sentence in the president's speech, ''he did not make them known'' to Bush or his staff, said national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

...

Rice said ''the CIA cleared the speech in its entirety.''

The agency raised only one objection to the sentence involving an allegation that Iraq was trying to obtain ''yellow cake'' uranium, she said.

...

''Some specifics about amount and place were taken out,'' Rice added.

''With the changes in that sentence, the speech was cleared,'' she said. ''The agency did not say they wanted that sentence out.''

...

If anyone at the CIA had doubts about the veracity of the uranium-Iraq allegation, Rice said, ''those doubts were not communicated to the president.''

...

''If the CIA the director of central intelligence had said 'Take this out of the speech,' it would have been gone,'' Rice said. ''We have a high standard for the president's speeches.''

Rice later made a perfunctory statement that the president still has confidence in Tenet's ability to the do the job. But, frankly, that seems hard to square with almost everything else she said.

One other point worth mentioning is that Rice seems to have conceded that Powell's doubts about the uranium story predated his UN presentation, but that he also didn't make his views known to the White House ...

Rice did say that the State Department's intelligence division considered the uranium-purchasing allegations dubious, and this was also noted in a footnote in the intelligence assessment given to Bush.

Powell, however, did not discuss his misgivings with her or anyone on her staff between the time of the State of the Union address and Powell's presentation to the United Nations, she said.

Rice's comments are flatly contradicted by several different news stories, which say that the CIA repeatedly pressed their objections, both prior to the speech and during the final sign off. However, Rice is going on the record. And that will give her version of events some added weight unless and until the unnamed sources on the other side do the same. She is as much as daring Tenet to contradict her.

At the same time, even the other reports show that the CIA did eventually cave, at least in a sense. They relented when the White House opted for the fig leaf of hanging the allegation on what the Brits were saying -- even though the CIA thought the Brits were wrong. If you read the rendition of events in last night's CBS report, the CIA still acquiesced in a version of the speech that was willfully misleading. It was only technically true because the Brits were saying that, even if our own intelligence agencies thought they were all wet, and had sought to stop them from publicly making the claim.

And this raises another question: just how much had the White House -- over a period of more than a year -- beaten down its intelligence professionals to the point where they just didn't want to stick their necks out any more? Just how much had the White House already made it very clear that it didn't want to hear any opinions or facts that got in the way of the president's Iraq policy? This is the point Ken Pollack made in his comments to TPM a few days ago. I think we're going to find that at many points and in many ways over the last year they made that message very clear.

A sad commentary, on so many levels.

From last night's Larry King with Bob Woodward ...

KING: The comments about -- that he has made concerning Iraq, where he sort of like -- well, Powell let's go to work -- Powell said first. Powell said it was a minor issue, this thing about uranium and Africa. Do you think it's a minor issue?

WOODWARD: It's got to be explained. But one of the things that's most difficult to understand is what is the basis of an intelligence report? And the CIA and the intelligence community do these things called National Intelligence Estimates. And they are big documents where they take all source intelligence, they put it together, they sit in a room, actually, and debate, do we believe this? Is this credible? Is this supported here?

They do them on things when we're not sure. You don't need a National Intelligence Estimate, for instance, on whether the Soviet Union is collapsed. We know it collapsed. But they would do National Intelligence Estimates on things like, well, what is the threat that Iraq poses? Weapons of mass destruction? And so it clearly says it's an estimate. They make judgments. I've seen some of these things. And there will be a liaison intelligence service report, say from the Jordanians, saying we have a source who says the following. There will be a satellite picture. They're little pieces, little fragments. And it's inevitable one's going to be wrong.

KING: But what makes the State of the Union? That's got to go through -- doesn't that go through a lot of checkpoints?

WOODWARD: Yes, yes, it does. And that's a serious mistake. They've backed off on it in the White House. But Bush needs to explain it. He needs to come forward and say hey, look, people accept in their human relations and in their presidents somebody who says, you know, I messed up on this, and this is how it happened. They need to do that.

KING: Were you surprised that Powell, kind of, dismissed it?

WOODWARD: Well, you know, I'm really on sound ground, here, when I say it's one little piece of thousands of pieces that get sifted when they put something like this together. And you know, I'm sure on occasion, on your show you've said something that turned out to be wrong. You've had bad information. I know in my work, it's happened. And you regret it and you step forward and say, I goofed.

KING: You don't see anything deliberate.

WOODWARD: Not at this point. Not at all. And at the same time, as Richard Nixon said, the cover-up is always worse than the offense. And if they try to not explain it, if they try to say, Oh, you know, we don't have to deal with this, or dismiss it, it's not going to work. They're going to have to come forward and say, Look, this came -- this person -- my understanding is there was some debate about it, and it may have been in one other speech earlier and got deleted and then got put in this one, so...

One little piece? De minimis deception?

I've long been fascinated by the dynamics of breaking news stories. One would imagine they move through a slow aggregation of facts. But that's seldom the case. A story can be reported by a good reporter with solid sources and nothing happens. Then the same story is reported a few weeks later and it explodes. Not so much the facts but the context is different, the moment, the mix of suspicions and momentum. It's reminiscent of the patterns discussed by historians of science like Thomas Kuhn or the sociologist Karl Mannheim.

But then I ditched that academic career, didn't I? So let's cut to the chase.

Tonight the CBS website is running a story that headlines ... "Bush Knew Iraq Info Was False."

For what it's worth, I think the headline gets out a bit ahead of what the story actually reports. But not by much. The key passage reads thus ...

Before the speech was delivered, the portions dealing with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were checked with the CIA for accuracy, reports CBS News National Security Correspondent David Martin.

CIA officials warned members of the President’s National Security Council staff the intelligence was not good enough to make the flat statement Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa.

The White House officials responded that a paper issued by the British government contained the unequivocal assertion: “Iraq has ... sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” As long as the statement was attributed to British Intelligence, the White House officials argued, it would be factually accurate. The CIA officials dropped their objections and that’s how it was delivered.

Let's be clear what this means. The White House ran the charge past the CIA. Folks at the agency said, we don't think it's true. The White House's response was to say, well, okay, we won't say whether it's true or not. We'll just say that the British say this. And the Brits are saying this. So we're good.

(Let's just agree that Republican grousing about 'depends what the definition of 'is' is' just ain't gonna have the same sting anymore, will it?)

As it happens, Tom Gjelten of NPR ran basically the exact same story three weeks ago on June 19th. You can hear Gjelten's report here. My description of it from a recent column in The Hill ran as follows ...

On June 19th, NPR’s Tom Gjelten added yet another piece to the puzzle. Apparently the intelligence folks even made their concerns known during the writing of the speech. “Earlier versions of the president’s speech did not cite British sources,” a senior intelligence official told Gjelten. “They were more definitive and we objected.”

At that point, according to Gjelten’s source, “White House officials” said “‘Why don’t we say the British say this?’”

The White House disputes Gjelten’s source’s account. But the upshot of the source’s accusation is pretty damning. If true, the White House really wanted to put the Niger uranium story in the speech. But faced with their own intelligence experts telling them the story was probably bogus, they decided to hang their allegation on the dossier the British had released last September.

This is, I think, exactly the same story. On June 19th it generated little if any attention. I suspect Martin's story will generate a good deal more.

What a difference a day makes! Or, okay, say two days, maybe three ...

Here's Colin Powell's statements today and yesterday on why the president used the uranium-Niger material in his State of the Union address and why Powell himself passed on those charges in his UN presentation.

According to Powell, the Niger uranium documents were "a reasonable statement at [the] time" the president used them in the State of the Union address on January 28th. But by the time Powell gave his presentation at the UN one week later, on February 5th, the charge "was not standing the test of time."

Actually, according to reports from Newsweek and other news outlets in late May and early June, Powell spent February 1st through 4th going over the intelligence evidence in meetings at the CIA. (He derided much of it with what the late, great J. Anthony Lukas once famously called a 'barnyard epithet'.) In any case, this would seem to show that the 'test of time' that the Niger evidence failed to stand stretched from January 29th, 2003 to February 1st, 2003.

Let's go to the tape ...

From today in Pretoria ...

And at the time of the President's State of the Union address, a judgment was made that that was an appropriate statement for the President to make. There was no effort or attempt on the part of the President, or anyone else in the administration, to mislead or to deceive the American people. The President was presenting what seemed to be a reasonable statement at that time -- and it didn't talk to Niger, it talked specifically about efforts to acquire uranium from nations that had it in Africa.

Subsequently, when we looked at it more thoroughly and when I think it's, oh, a week or two later, when I made my presentation to the United Nations and we really went through every single thing we knew about all of the various issues with respect to weapons of mass destruction, we did not believe that it was appropriate to use that example anymore. It was not standing the test of time. And so I didn't use it, and we haven't used it since.

And from yesterday's interview with the BBC ...
MR. FREI: Two more brief ones, if I may, Niger and the issue of the allegations of the uranium exports to Iraq. You, yourself, if I am correct in thinking, thought that that was not a truthful allegation at the time it was made; is that right?

SECRETARY POWELL: The question is not truthfulness. The question is credibility at a moment in time.

MR. FREI: But you had your doubts about it, didn't you?

SECRETARY POWELL: I did not use it in the formal presentation I made on the 5th of February because by then there was such controversy about it, and as we looked at all that we knew about it, it did not seem to be the kind of claim that I should take into the UN. [emphasis added]

What are we, the United States of Chopped Liver? Can't we get the non-bogus intel briefing too? And since when are Republicans UN lovers? I'm lost ...

TPMLivewire