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David Kurtz

David Kurtz is Managing Editor and Washington Bureau Chief of Talking Points Memo where he oversees the news operations of TPM and its sister sites.

Articles by David

Dick Cheney, today on Face the Nation, when asked about the U.S. Attorney purge:

Well, as vice president, I don't know anything about the particular problem you're talking about. I mean, it took place inside the Justice Department. The one who needs to answer to that and lay out on the record the specifics of what transpired is the attorney general, and he'll do so.


Alberto Gonzales is, as John Ehrlichman said, "twisting slowly, slowly in the wind."

"Nothing Improper" is the title of the attorney general's Washington Post op-ed previewing his testimony to Congress this week.

The appointment of Rachel Paulose to be the U.S. attorney for Minnesota continues to be a source of puzzlement. Stung by the resignation of four of the top administrators in her office, Paulose agreed to an interview with the Star Tribune and professed to have been completely out of the loop on the U.S. attorney purge:

"These wild conspiracy theories are just that -- totally off base," Paulose said in her first interview on the subject. "No one communicated to me--in any form--about any plan to remove any U.S. attorney."


So how did a 33-year-old Republican lawyer go, in less than two months, from private practice in Minnesota to senior counselor to the deputy attorney general in Washington and then back to Minnesota as an interim U.S. attorney? Here's Paulose's version of what happened, as reported by the Star Tribune:

In January 2006, she was recruited for a job as senior counselor to the deputy attorney general, working primarily on health care policy.

Paulose said she never met Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty until she applied to work for him. Nor was she close to Gonzales, adding that they have never had a one-on-one meeting.

She says Monica Goodling, the Justice Department's former liaison to the White House, is a friend. Goodling invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination and refused to testify before a Senate committee investigating the replacement of U.S. attorneys.

But they didn't meet until January 2006. Neither Goodling nor anyone else ever told her about a plan to replace U.S. attorneys, Paulose said.

Six weeks after starting her job in Washington, Minnesota U.S. Attorney Thomas Heffelfinger resigned, and Paulose was quickly appointed as his interim replacement. A lifelong Republican, she said she was as surprised by the appointment as anyone, noting that she had signed a year's lease for an apartment in Chevy Chase, Md.

Sen. Norm Coleman, R-Minn., submitted the names of two candidates to replace Heffelfinger. His staff said Paulose was not one of them. Clayton Robinson, a longtime friend of Coleman's who now oversees criminal cases in Ramsey County, said he interviewed for the U.S. attorney job in March 2006, but was told several weeks later that the administration was looking elsewhere.

Coleman eventually embraced Paulose's nomination, largely based on recommendations from respected lawyers, and the Senate confirmed her in December.


It's quite a remarkable run, especially since Paulose didn't have the support of Coleman, who as the state's sole Republican senator would usually play a pivotal role in selecting his state's U.S. attorney.

There's more to this. There has to be. Paulose has laid down quite a marker though: She was as surprised as anyone when she was appointed interim U.S. attorney. Keep that marker in mind as this story unfolds.

McClatchy:

Philip Heymann, a Harvard law professor and former deputy attorney general under Reno, said the Justice Department has always been vulnerable to allegations of playing politics with prosecutions.

"But these allegations are vastly greater and more credible," Heymann said. "Really good attorney generals go out of their way to keep appearances straight as well as realities. I think something serious has been going on, and I think it's terribly important that it come out.

"If politicians were going to the White House and saying they didn't want this or that case brought, and the White House was letting the U.S. attorneys know by firing them, it would be terribly immoral and destructive."

An inside look at how the Department of Justice has changed under George W. Bush, and particularly under Alberto Gonzales.

Update: Some readers have asked me to further highlight the piece I linked to above, an interview that Daniel Metcalfe, a recently retired senior career DOJ lawyer, gave to the Legal Times' Tony Mauro. Gladly.

Metcalfe had been with the Justice Department since 1971, so much of the perspective what he is able to offer on the Bush Justice Department is historical. Here is Metcalfe on how quickly things changed after Alberto Gonzales became attorney general:

Ever since the Watergate era, when Edward Levi came in as attorney general to replace former Sen. William Saxby soon after Nixon resigned, the Justice Department maintained a healthy distance between it and what could be called the raw political concerns that are properly within the White House's domain. Even Reagan's first attorney general, William French Smith, did not depart greatly from the standard that Levi set; as for Meese, I knew him to be more heavily involved in defending himself from multiple ethics investigations than in bringing the department too close to the White House, even though he came from there.

More recently, of course, the DOJ-White House distance hit its all-time high-water mark under Janet Reno, especially during Clinton's second term. And even John Ashcroft made it clear to all department employees that, among other things, he held that traditional distance in proper reverence; he proved that this was no mere lip service when, from his hospital bed, he refused to overrule Deputy AG Comey on what is now called the "terrorist surveillance program." Especially in the wake of 9/11, which strongly spurred the morale and dedication of Justice Department employees, myself included, I saw only a limited morale diminution in general during the first term.

But that strong tradition of independence over the previous 30 years was shattered in 2005 with the arrival of the White House counsel as a second-term AG. All sworn assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, it was as if the White House and Justice Department now were artificially tied at the hip -- through their public affairs, legislative affairs and legal policy offices, for example, as well as where you ordinarily would expect such a connection (i.e., Justice's Office of Legal Counsel). I attended many meetings in which this total lack of distance became quite clear, as if the current crop of political appointees in those offices weren't even aware of the important administration-of-justice principles that they were trampling.


Metcalfe also makes an interesting--and on its face, plausible--claim that I don't recall hearing before: namely, that the traditional second term decline in the quality of new political appointees is worse in Republican administrations:

I'll now say something that might sound partisan, even coming from a purposely nonpartisan registered independent, but it's really not: In my experience over 11 presidential administrations, from Nixon I to what can be called Bush III, there is an unmistakable drop-off in overall appointment quality during a second presidential term -- and this definitely is more so during a Republican administration. Perhaps this is due to there being a lower quality of political appointees in Republican administrations to begin with, given that, by and large, they give up more than Democrats do to enter government service, especially with the post-Watergate ethics restrictions that all government officials face.

This observation is nothing new, by the way; one need only look at the relative ages and experience levels of comparable appointees in successive administrations to see it. So when you enter the second term of a Republican administration, you get the worst of all possible worlds: You actually see some influential political appointees who are, to put it bluntly, too subject-matter ignorant to even realize how ignorant they are. (This is assuming that, if they knew, they'd actually care.)

And compounding this, as mentioned earlier, is the strong drive of political appointees at all levels (perhaps more so if they are attorneys, whose background is amenable to legal positions throughout the executive branch) to obtain that maximum capstone position before the second term ends. What happens to bureaucracy at such a time is that it becomes sluggish to the point of constipation, driven only by expediency as gauged from a political or personal agenda, and it sometimes yields some truly mind-boggling results, such as the current U.S. Attorney nightmare.


Metcalfe's perspective is worth considering. It is, in some respects, a more benign explanation for some of what we have seen than I might favor. I use "benign" guardedly because what Metcalfe witnessed in the last two years of his tenure at DOJ was clearly distressing to him and, in his view, marred the department's reputation, something he took great pride in.

What I mean is that the dysfunction he describes at the staff level can be seen as the cause of the purge scandal or it can be seen as a means to an end. If you subscribe to the former view, then Purgegate is a mess that could have been avoided if it had merely been handled better, a public relations snafu due to poor staffing. The latter view, which is perhaps more cynical but I also think more realistic, is that placing young, inexperienced, impressionable staffers in high level department positions enabled higher-ups in the Administration to exert far greater control in promulgating the Rove political agenda. (That staff level youth and inexperience could be blamed when and if the crap hit the fan was merely another advantage to the plan.)

Second term malaise may have a historical precedent, but the politicization of the Justice Department is classic Karl Rove.

I'm afraid yesterday's AP story on No Gun Ri is going to get lost in the swirl of more immediately pressing scandals, but it's such an important piece, I want to draw your attention to it:

Six years after declaring the U.S. killing of Korean War refugees at No Gun Ri was "not deliberate," the Army has acknowledged it found but did not divulge that a high-level document said the U.S. military had a policy of shooting approaching civilians in South Korea.

The document, a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea to the State Department in Washington, is dated the day in 1950 when U.S. troops began the No Gun Ri shootings, in which survivors say hundreds, mostly women and children, were killed.

Exclusion of the embassy letter from the Army's 2001 investigative report is the most significant among numerous omissions of documents and testimony pointing to a policy of firing on refugee groups — undisclosed evidence uncovered by Associated Press archival research and Freedom of Information Act requests. . . .

More than a dozen documents — in which high-ranking U.S. officers tell troops that refugees are "fair game," for example, and order them to "shoot all refugees coming across river" — were found by the AP in the investigators' own archived files after the 2001 inquiry. None of those documents was disclosed in the Army's 300-page public report. . . .

Despite this, the Army's e-mail to the AP maintains, as did the 2001 report, "No policy purporting to authorize soldiers to shoot refugees was ever promulgated to soldiers in the field." . . .


There's a lot more detail in the AP piece about how the 2001 report which exonerated the Army left out or mischaracterized key pieces of evidence from the Army's own records.

It's never too late to get this sort of thing right, and given the looming historical accounting America will have to do on Iraq and the War on Terror, we better learn how to do it right.

Walter Pincus reports on the Administration's proposed revisions to FISA, which include immunizing telecommunications companies who cooperate in the Administration's surveillance programs from lawsuits by their customers. That provision would be retroactive to Sept 11, 2001 (via War and Piece).

White House agrees to coordinate with the Senate Judiciary Committee on choosing an independent consultant to recover all those lost emails.

Nice. The Senate gets to help pick who will find the emails but the White House still hasn't agreed to let the Senate see the emails once they are found. Ah, compromise.

Update: Speaking of compromise, Fred Fielding has his work cut out for him:

Sources tell NPR that Fielding actually wants to negotiate with Congress about how the interviews [of White House staff] will take place. But Fielding has not been able to persuade President Bush to go along.

Condi takes another one for the team:

After intense internal debate, the Bush administration has decided to hold on to five Iranian Revolutionary Guard intelligence agents captured in Iraq, overruling a State Department recommendation to release them, according to U.S. officials.

At a meeting of the president's foreign policy team Tuesday, the administration decided the five Iranians will remain in custody and go through a periodic six-month review used for the 250 other foreign detainees held in Iraq, U.S. officials said. The next review is not expected until July, officials say. . . .

Differences over the five Iranians reflect an emerging divide on how to deal with Iran. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went into the meeting Tuesday advising that the men be freed because they are no longer useful, but after a review of options she went along with the consensus, U.S. officials say. Vice President Cheney's office made the firmest case for keeping them.

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