In May, former acting attorney general James Comey testified that then-White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and then-chief of staff Andrew Card rushed to the hospital room an incapacitated John Ashcroft on March 10, 2004 after Comey ruled that the president’s warrantless surveillance program lacked sufficient legal authority to continue. Today, Gonzales gave two defenses of this ghoulish maneuver: first, that he and Card only went to Ashcroft because Congress wanted the program to continue; and second, that they merely intended to “inform” Ashcroft of Comey’s decision — not get a convalescent AG to overrule his designated deputy.
Gonzales weaves through this new story, which he said gave “context” for the hospital excursion — in which FBI Director Robert Mueller told his agents not to allow Gonzales to have Comey removed from Ashcroft’s room — to several senators. First, Gonzales told Arlen Specter (R-PA) that the trip to Ashcroft’s hospital followed a meeting by the so-called “Group of Eight” — the bipartisan congressional leaders briefed into the so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program — at the White House to convince them of the seriousness of its imminent expiration. Specter nearly blew a fuse when he understood that Gonzales was suggesting that Congress wanted Comey overturned:
Amazingly, Gonzales turned to his second line of defense: that he wasn’t trying to get Ashcroft to reverse Comey “if in fact he wasn’t fully competent to make that decision.” How could Gonzales lean on Ashcroft at all, given that Ashcroft had delegated his authority to Comey? “There are no rules” governing the matter, Gonzales said.
Gonzales got much softer treatment from Orrin Hatch (R-UT).
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) wasn’t so forgiving. She noted reversing Comey was “clearly the only reason why you would go see the attorney general in intensive care.” Gonzales replied that he was under “extraordinary circumstances,” in which “we had just been advised by the Congressional leadership, go forward anyway, and we felt it important that the attorney general, general Ashcroft, be advised of those facts.”
Later in the hearing, Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) got Gonzales to admit that he indeed entered Ashcroft’s hospital room bearing a reauthorization order from the White House for the program — something it’s hard to believe Gonzales would have carried if he wasn’t trying to get Ashcroft to reauthorize the surveillance regardless of his condition. Video of that exchange to come.
Update: Here’s Whitehouse vs. Gonzales:
Below are all the transcripts:
SPECTER: OK.
Assuming you’re leveling with us on this occasion…
(CROSSTALK)
SPECTER: No, I want to move to the point about how can you get approval from Ashcroft for anything when he’s under sedation and incapacitated — for anything.GONZALES: May I continue the story, Senator?
SPECTER: No, I want you to answer my question.
GONZALES: Senator, obviously there was concern about General Ashcroft’s condition.
GONZALES: And we would not have sought nor did we intend to get any approval from General Ashcroft if in fact he wasn’t fully competent to make that decision.
But General — there are no rules governing whether or not General Ashcroft can decide, “I’m feeling well enough to make this decision.”SPECTER: But, Attorney General Gonzales, he had already given up his authority as attorney general.
(CROSSTALK)
SPECTER: … was no longer attorney general.GONZALES: And he could always reclaim that.
There are no rules…SPECTER: While he’s in the hospital under sedation?
(LAUGHTER)
GONZALES: Again, we didn’t know — we knew, of course, that he was ill, that he’d had surgery…SPECTER: Not making any progress here. Let me go to another topic.
You may not have had a full opportunity to explain what happened the day of your hospital visit to Attorney General Ashcroft. So if you would, please finish your description of those events so we can all understand just what happened there.
GONZALES: The meeting that I was referring to occurred on the afternoon of March 10th, just hours before Andy Card and I went to the hospital.
GONZALES: And the purpose of that meeting was to advise the gang of eight, the leadership of the Congress, that Mr. Comey had informed us that he would not approve the continuation of a very important intelligence activity despite the fact the department had repeatedly approved those activities over a period of over two years.
We informed the leadership that Mr. Comey felt the president did not have the authority to authorize these activities, and we were there asking for help, to ask for emergency legislation.
HATCH: Was Mr. Comey there during those two years?GONZALES: He was not there during the entire time, no, sir.
HATCH: How much of that time?
GONZALES: I can’t recall now, Senator, when Jim Comey became the deputy attorney general.
The consensus in the room from the congressional leadership is that we should continue the activities, at least for now, despite the objections of Mr. Comey.
There was also consensus that it would be very, very difficult to obtain legislation without compromising this program, but that we should look for a way ahead.
It is for this reason that within a matter of hours Andy Card and I went to the hospital. We felt it important that the attorney general knew about the views and the recommendations of the congressional leadership, that as a former member of Congress and as someone who had authorized these activities for over two years that it might be important for him to hear this information.
That was the reason that Mr. Card and I went to the hospital.
Obviously, we were concerned about the condition of General Ashcroft. We obviously knew he had been ill and had surgery. And we never had any intent to ask anything of him if we did not feel that he was competent.
When we got there, I will just say that Mr. Ashcroft did most of the talking. We were there maybe five minutes — five to six minutes.
Mr. Ashcroft talked about the legal issues in a lucid form, as I’ve heard him talk about legal issues in the White House. But at the end of his description of the legal issues, he said, “I’m not making this decision. The deputy attorney general is.”
And so Andy Card and I thanked him. We told him that we would continue working with the deputy attorney general and we left.
And so I just wanted to put in context for this committee and the American people why Mr. Card and I went. It’s because we had an emergency meeting in the White House Situation Room, where the congressional leadership had told us, “Continue going forward with this very important intelligence activity.”
I might also add…HATCH: That was the gang of eight, you’re saying.
GONZALES: Pardon me?
HATCH: That was the gang of eight.
GONZALES: This was the gang of eight.
HATCH: The two leaders in the House, the two leaders in the Senate, the two leaders of the Intelligence Committee in the House and the two leaders of the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, right?
GONZALES: That is correct.
I might also add…HATCH: Democrats and Republicans?
GONZALES: Democrats and Republicans.
I might also add that the urgency was is that the authorities in question were set to expire the very next day.HATCH: Right.
GONZALES: And the president believed this was a very important activity, as did the congressional leadership. In fact, the very next morning we had the Madrid bombings. And so that puts in perspective the context of the environment that we were operating under. And these are the reasons why we went to the hospital on the evening of March 10th.
FEINSTEIN: And I listen to you. And nothing gets answered directly. Everything is obfuscated.
You can’t tell me that you went up to see Mr. Comey for any other reason other than to reverse his decision about the terrorist surveillance program. That’s clearly the only reason you would go to see the attorney general in intensive care.
GONZALES: May I respond to that?FEINSTEIN: Yes, you may.
GONZALES: OK. You’re right. This is an extraordinary event. But we were confronting extraordinary circumstances where we had been advised that something that the department had authorized for two years, they would no longer continue to approve.
We’d just been advised by the congressional leadership: Go forward anyway. And we felt it important that the attorney general, General Ashcroft, was aware of those facts.
Clearly, if we had been confident and understood the facts and was inclined to do so, yes, we would have asked him to reverse the DAG’s position. But…FEINSTEIN: Well, then, why would he have said Mr. Comey is in charge, if you hadn’t asked him?
GONZALES: I don’t understand the question.
FEINSTEIN: Well, clearly you asked him the question, because James Comey testified to us that…
GONZALES: My recollection, Senator, is — and, of course, this happened some time ago and people’s recollections are going to differ. My recollection is that Mr. Ashcroft did most of the talking. At the end, my recollection is, he said, “I’ve been told it would be improvident for me to sign. But that doesn’t matter, because I’m no longer the attorney general.”
FEINSTEIN: OK. All right.
GONZALES: And once he said that, Secretary Card and I didn’t press him. We said thank you, and we left.
FEINSTEIN: OK.
GONZALES: But, again, we went there because we thought it important for him to know where the congressional leadership was on this. We didn’t know whether or not he knew of Mr. Comey’s position and, if he did know, whether or not he agreed with it.
GONZALES: I’m not sure I can give you complete comfort — I’m not sure I want to give you complete comfort on that point, out of fairness to others involved in what happened here.
I want to be very fair to them. But what I’m — what we are talking about…WHITEHOUSE: (inaudible) different question.
LEAHY: Why not just be fair to the truth?
Just be fair to the truth and answer the question.(APPLAUSE)
WHITEHOUSE: Was Attorney General Ashcroft read into, and did he approve the program at issue from its inception?GONZALES: General Ashcroft was read into these activities, and did approve these activities…
WHITEHOUSE: Beginning when?
GONZALES: From the very beginning. I believe, from the very beginning.
WHITEHOUSE: All right.
GONZALES: But, well…
WHITEHOUSE: I’m sorry? My question…
(CROSSTALK)
GONZALES: Again, it’s very complicated. And I want to be fair to General Ashcroft and others involved in this. And it’s hard to describe this in this open setting. We’ve tried to be — we’ve tried to discuss — we have discussed in the Intel Committees, in terms of exactly what happened here.
But I can’t get into the fine details, quite frankly, because I want to be fair to General Ashcroft.WHITEHOUSE: And I think it’s also important that people know whether or not a program was run with or without the approval of the Department of Justice but without the knowledge and approval of the attorney general of the United States, if that was ever the case.
GONZALES: We believe we had the approval of the attorney general of the United States for a period of two years.
WHITEHOUSE: For a period of two years?
GONZALES: That is what…
(CROSSTALK)
WHITEHOUSE: Also from the inception of the program?GONZALES: From the very — from the inception, we believed that we had the approval of the attorney general of the United States for these activities, these particular activities.
WHITEHOUSE: Would that be reflected in any document?
GONZALES: Yes, it would.
WHITEHOUSE: We’ll pursue the document later.
When you went into the attorney general’s room at the hospital that night, what document did you have in your hand?GONZALES: I had in my possession a document to reauthorize the program.
WHITEHOUSE: Where is it now?
GONZALES: I’m assuming the document is at the White House. It was a White House document.
WHITEHOUSE: And it would be covered by presidential records laws?
GONZALES: It is a White House document.
WHITEHOUSE: Director Mueller was involved that evening. Do you consider Director Mueller to be reasonable, sober and level-headed?
GONZALES: Yes.
WHITEHOUSE: He’s a former deputy attorney general, former United States attorney?
GONZALES: Yes.
WHITEHOUSE: Why would he tell FBI agents not to allow you and Andy Card to throw the acting attorney general out of the attorney general’s hospital room?
GONZALES: I don’t know that he did that, and I can’t respond to your question. I’m not Director Mueller.
WHITEHOUSE: But we have direct testimony that he did. You can’t — is there any series of events that led up to this that would so provoke him…
GONZALES: I wasn’t aware of that comment until I read Mr. Comey’s testimony.
WHITEHOUSE: Is there some background to this that would help elaborate why he would have that feeling?
I mean, when the FBI director considers you so nefarious that FBI agents had to be ordered not to leave you alone with the stricken attorney general, that’s a fairly serious challenge.GONZALES: Well, again, I’m not sure that the director knew at the time of the meeting and a conversation that we had had with the congressional leaders.
We were — again, we were there following an emergency meeting in the White House Situation Room with the gang of eight, who said, “Despite the recommendation of the attorney general, go forward with very important intelligence activities for now and we’ll see about moving forward some legislation.” And that was important information that led us to go to the hospital room.
The director, I’m quite confident, did not have that information when he made those statements, if he made those statements.WHITEHOUSE: Is it awkward to supervise the FBI after this piece of history has come out, that the director didn’t feel comfortable leaving you alone with the attorney general?
GONZALES: I can’t speak for the director’s feelings about me. But I still have a great deal of confidence and admiration and respect for Bob Mueller.
